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Abstract
This paper characterizes an equilibrium payoff subset for dynamic Bayesian games
as discounting vanishes. Monitoring is imperfect, transitions may depend on actions,
types may be correlated and values may be interdependent. The focus is on equilibria
in which players report truthfully. The characterization generalizes that for repeated
games, reducing the analysis to static Bayesian games with transfers. With independent private values, the restriction to truthful equilibria is without loss, except for the
punishment level; if players withhold their information during punishment-like phases,
a folk theorem obtains.
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Introduction

This paper studies the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ set of dynamic Bayesian games. In
doing so, it generalizes methods that were developed for repeated games (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1994; Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994, hereafter, FL and FLM) and later
extended to stochastic games (Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi and Vieille, 2011, hereafter HSTV)
to games with incomplete information.
The contribution of this paper is as follows. First, we deﬁne a class of equilibria –truthful
equilibria– in which players report their private information honestly in every period, on
∗

Yale, 30 Hillhouse Ave., New Haven, CT 06520, USA, johannes.horner@yale.edu.
National University of Singapore, ecsst@nus.edu.sg.
‡
HEC Paris, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas, France, vieille@hec.fr.

†

1

and oﬀ path, and do not condition their play on past private information. This class of
strategies specializes to public strategies (and truthful equilibria to perfect public equilibria)
in the case of complete information. Second, we relate truthful equilibrium payoﬀs (as the
discount factor tends to one) to a static Bayesian game augmented with transfers. Here
as well, this is a natural generalization of the results for repeated games (Fudenberg and
Levine, 1994, in particular). Third, we prove that the restriction to truthful equilibria is
without loss in some contexts (again, as δ → 1). In particular, we show that this is the case
with independent private values, where truthful equilibria are only restrictive for obedience.
That is, under usual identiﬁability conditions, truthfulness only limits how low a particular
player’s equilibrium payoﬀ can be.
Relative to existing papers on games with persistent private information, the set of equilibrium payoﬀs we obtain is larger,1 and tight under some conditions. Furthermore, the class
of games considered is signiﬁcantly more general. Our methods apply to games exhibiting:
- moral hazard (imperfect monitoring);
- endogenous serial correlation (actions aﬀecting transitions);
- correlated types (across players) and interdependent values.
These features are all missing from the existing literature (with the exception of interdependent values, which is exhibited by the cheap-talk game of Renault, Solan and Vieille, 2013,
and imperfect monitoring, in the class considered by Barron, 2013).
Allowing for such features is not merely of theoretical interest. There are many applications in which some if not all of them are relevant. In insurance markets, for instance, there
is clearly persistent adverse selection (risk types), moral hazard (accidents and claims having
a stochastic component), interdependent values, action-dependent transitions (risk-reducing
behaviors) and, in the case of systemic risk, correlated types. The same holds true in ﬁnancial asset management, and in many other applications of such models (taste or endowment
shocks, etc.)
More precisely, we assume that the state proﬁle –each coordinate of which is private
information to a player– follows a controlled autonomous irreducible Markov chain. (Irreducibility refers to its behavior under any ﬁxed Markov strategy.) In the stage game, players
privately take actions, and then a public signal realizes, whose distribution may depend
1

The one exception is the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ in Renault, Solan and Vieille (2013), who also characterize Pareto-inferior “babbling” equilibria, in a game that has interdependent values.
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both on the state and action proﬁle, and the next round state proﬁle is drawn. Cheap-talk
communication is allowed, in the form of a public report at the beginning of each round.
As mentioned, our analysis is about truthful equilibria. In a truthful equilibrium, players
truthfully reveal their type at the beginning of each round, after every history. In addition,
players’ action choices are public: they only depend on their current type and the public
history. While concentrating on truth-telling equilibria is with loss of generality given the
absence of any commitment, it nevertheless turns out that this limit set includes the payoﬀ
sets obtained in all the special cases studied by the literature.
In Sections 2–5, we focus on the case of independent private values: payoﬀs only depend
on a player’s own private information (and the action proﬁle), and this information evolves
independently across players, conditional on the public information and one’s own private
action. We provide a family of one-shot games with transfers that reduce the analysis
from a dynamic inﬁnite-horizon game to a static game. Unlike the one-shot game of FL
and HSTV (special cases of ours), this one-shot game is Bayesian. Each player makes a
report, then takes an action; the transfer is then determined. This reduction provides a
bridge between dynamic games and Bayesian mechanism design. As explained below, its
payoﬀ function is not entirely standard, raising interesting new issues for static mechanism
design. Nonetheless, well-known results can be adapted for a wide class of dynamic games.
Under independent private values (and also under correlated types), the analysis of the oneshot game yields an equilibrium payoﬀ set that is best possible, except for the deﬁnition of
individual rationality.
For such games, we prove a folk theorem: truthful equilibria might be restrictive in
terms of individual rationality (lowest equilibrium payoﬀ for a given player), but they do
not restrict the set of equilibrium payoﬀs otherwise. Leaving aside individual rationality,
we show that the payoﬀ set attained by truthful equilibria is actually equal to the limit
set of all Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, whichever message sets one chooses. In other
words, in the revelation game in which players commit to the map from reports to actions,
but not to current or future reports, there is no loss of generality in restricting attention
to truthful equilibria. In this sense, the revelation principle extends, despite the absence of
commitment, provided players are patient enough. Beyond generalizing the results of Athey
and Bagwell (2001), as well as Escobar and Toikka (2013), this characterization has some
interesting consequences. For instance, when actions do not aﬀect transitions, the invariant
distribution of the Markov chain is a suﬃcient statistic for the Markov process, as far as this
equilibrium payoﬀ set is concerned, leaving individual rationality aside.
In Section 5, we further concentrate on games in which monitoring has a product struc3

ture. This is the class of games for which, absent any private information, existing “folk”
theorems are actual characterizations of the set of (limit) sequential equilibrium payoﬀs.
While insisting on truthfulness might be restrictive in terms of individual rationality (as
mentioned above) we show that, for the case of product structure, a simple twist on such
equilibria (in which players abstain from reporting their private information when punishing
others) provides an exact characterization of all Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs.
In Section 6, we state a general version of our main theorem, which provides a subset
of limit equilibrium payoﬀs, whether types are correlated and values are private, or not.
Conclusive characterizations are obtained under independent private values and correlated
types. The paper focuses mostly on private independent values. The case of correlated
types is relegated to the working paper. This mirrors the state of aﬀairs in static mechanism
design. In fact, our results are obtained by applying familiar techniques to the one-shot game,
developed by Arrow (1979) and d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1979) for the independent
case, and d’Aspremont, Crémer and Gérard-Varet (2003) in the correlated case.
Our approach stands in contrast with the techniques based on review strategies (see Escobar and Toikka 2013 for instance) whose adaptation to incomplete information is inspired by
the linking mechanism described in Fang and Norman (2006) and Jackson and Sonnenschein
(2007). Our results imply that, as is already the case for repeated games with public monitoring, transferring continuation payoﬀs across players is an instrument that is suﬃciently
powerful to dispense with explicit statistical tests. Of course, this instrument requires that
deviations in the players’ reports can be statistically distinguished, a property that calls for
assumptions closely related to those called for in static mechanism design. Here as well, we
build on results from static mechanism design (in particular the weak identiﬁability condition introduced by Kosenok and Severinov (2008)) to ensure budget balance in the dynamic
game.
While the characterization turns out to be a natural generalization of the one from
repeated games with public monitoring, it still has several unexpected features, reﬂecting
diﬃculties in the proof that are not present either in stochastic games with observable states.
These diﬃculties shift the emphasis of the program from payoﬀs to strategies.
To bring these diﬃculties to light, consider precisely independent private values. Together
with the irreducibility of the Markov chain, independence implies that the long-run (or
asymptotic) payoﬀ of a player is independent of his current state. To incentivize a player to
disclose his private information, it does not suﬃce to adjust his long-run payoﬀ, as such an
adjustment aﬀects all the diﬀerent types identically (and so cannot give them strict incentives
to use diﬀerent strategies). On the other hand, we cannot focus on the ﬂow payoﬀ either to
4

provide such incentives, as with persistent types, a player’s private information also enters
his continuation payoﬀs. Hence, player i’s incentives to disclose his information depends on
the impact of his report on the transient component of his long-run payoﬀ; that is, loosely
speaking, on his ﬂow payoﬀs until the eﬀect of the initial state fades away. This transient
component is bounded from above, even as δ → 1: unlike in repeated games, future payoﬀs
do not eclipse ﬂow payoﬀs, as far as incentives to tell the truth regarding one’s type are
concerned. Furthermore, this transient component depends on the player’s initial state,
according to the future actions played. On the other hand, as far as obedience is concerned
(playing the agreed upon action proﬁle, given the public reports), the usual logic applies,
since this action does not depend on the player’s private information: changes in long-run
payoﬀs according to the realized public signal provide adequate incentives.
Hence, the proof adopts two time scales. Over the short run, the policy that players
follow (the map from reports to actions) is ﬁxed. The resulting transient component follows
directly, and is treated as a ﬂow payoﬀ. In other words, in the short run, the ﬂow payoﬀ
is computed as if strategies were Markov: the relative value that arises in (undiscounted)
dynamic programming is precisely the right measure for this transient component. In the
long run, play is decidedly non-Markovian. Play switches towards a new Markov strategy
proﬁle that metes out punishments and rewards according to the history of public signals.
The two time scales interact, however, leading to a characterization that intermingles
both the relative value (treated as an adjustment to the ﬂow payoﬀ) and the changes in the
long-run payoﬀ (treated, as usual, as a transfer).
Games without commitment but with imperfectly persistent private types were introduced in Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008) in the context of Bertrand oligopoly with privately
observed cost. Athey and Segal (2013, hereafter AS) allow for transfers and prove an efﬁciency result for ergodic Markov games with independent types. Their team balanced
mechanism is closely related to a normalization that is applied to the transfers in one of our
proofs in the case of independent private values.
There is also a literature on undiscounted zero-sum games with such a Markovian structure, see Renault (2006), which builds on ideas introduced in Aumann and Maschler (1995).
Because of the importance of such games for applications in industrial organization and
macroeconomics, there is an extensive literature on recursive formulations for ﬁxed discount
factors. In game theory, recent progress has been made in the case in which the state is
observed, see Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011) and HSTV for an asymptotic analysis, and
Pęski and Wiseman (2014) for the case in which the state transition becomes infrequent as
the time lag between consecutive moves goes to zero. There are some similarities in the
5

techniques used, although incomplete information introduces signiﬁcant complications.2
More related are the papers by Athey and Bagwell (2001, 2008), Escobar and Toikka
(2013), Barron (2013) and Renault, Solan and Vieille. All these papers assume that types
are independent across players. Barron introduces imperfect monitoring in Escobar and
Toikka (whose model generalizes most of the results of Athey and Bagwell), but restricts
attention to the case of one informed player only. This is also the case in Renault, Solan and
Vieille. This is the only paper that allows for interdependent values, although in the context
of a very particular model, namely, a sender-receiver game with perfect monitoring. As
mentioned, none of these papers allow transitions to depend on actions. When specialized to
the environments considered by Escobar and Toikka, our result provides a characterization
of the asymptotic equilibrium payoﬀ set in these environments, which in general is larger
than the set that they identify.
Section 2 introduces the model and deﬁnes truthful equilibria. Mostly for pedagogical
reasons, we start our analysis of independent private values with the special case in which
monitoring is perfect and actions do not aﬀect transitions (this is the environment of Escobar
and Toikka). In Section 4, we drop these two restrictions but stick with independent private
values. Section 5 indicates how one can obtain a true “folk theorem” by slightly relaxing
the class of equilibria considered (and specializing to an environment in which there is any
hope of achieving such a folk theorem –product monitoring). Section 6 deﬁnes the one-shot
Bayesian game in full generality. Readers interested in the application to correlated values
are referred to the working paper.

2

Model and Equilibrium

We consider dynamic games with imperfectly persistent incomplete information.

2.1

Extensive Form

The stage game is as follows. The ﬁnite set of players is denoted I. We assume that there
are at least two players. Each player i ∈ I has a ﬁnite set S i of (private) states, or types,
2

Among others, HSTV (as before FLM) rely on the equilibrium payoﬀ set being full-dimensional, an
assumption that fails with independent private values: When the players’ types follow independent Markov
chains and values are private, the players’ limit equilibrium payoﬀ must be independent of their initial type,
given irreducibility and incentive-compatibility.
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and a ﬁnite set Ai of actions. The state si ∈ S i is private information to player i. We denote
by S := ×i∈I S i and A := ×i∈I Ai the sets of state proﬁles and action proﬁles respectively.
In each round n ≥ 1, timing is as follows:
1. Each player i ∈ I privately observes his own state sin ∈ S i ;
2. Players simultaneously make reports (min )Ii=1 ∈ ×i M i , where M i is a ﬁnite set. These
reports are publicly observed;
3. The outcome of a public randomization device (p.r.d.) is observed. For concreteness,
it is a draw from the uniform distribution on [0, 1];3
4. Players independently choose actions ain ∈ Ai . Actions taken are not observed;
5. A public signal yn ∈ Y , a ﬁnite set, and the next state proﬁle sn+1 = (sin+1 )i∈I are
drawn according to some joint distribution p(·, · | sn , an ) ∈ ∆(S × Y ).
The stage-game payoﬀ or reward of player i is a function r i : S × A → R, whose domain
is extended to mixed action proﬁles in ∆(A). As is customary, we may interpret this reward
as the expected value (with respect to the signal y) of some function g i : S × Ai × Y → R,
r i (s, a) = E[g i (s, ai , y) | s, a]. In that case, given (s, ai , y), the realized reward does not
convey additional information about a−i , so that whether this reward is observed or not is
irrelevant (for the updating of beliefs over a−i , conditional on (s, ai , y)) . We do not make this
assumption, but assume instead that realized rewards are not observed. Hence, we assume
that a player’s private action, private state, the public signal and report proﬁle are all the
information available to him.
Given the sequence of realized rewards (rni ) = (r i (sn , an )), player i’s payoﬀ in the dynamic
game is given by
+∞
X
(1 − δ)δ n−1 rni ,
n=1

where δ ∈ [0, 1) is common to all players. (Short-run players can be accommodated for, as
will be discussed.)
The dynamic game also speciﬁes an initial distribution π1 ∈ ∆(S), which plays no role in
the analysis, given the irreducibility assumption we will impose and the focus on equilibrium
payoﬀ vectors as elements of RI as δ → 1.
3

We do not know how to dispense with it. But given that public communication is allowed, such a public
randomization device is innocuous, as it can be replaced by jointly controlled lotteries.

7

Our focus will be on independent private values (hereafter, IPV). This is deﬁned as the
special case in which (i) transitions satisfy
p(t, y | s, a) = p(y | a) × ×i∈I pi (ti | si , y),
as well as
π1 (s) = ×i∈I π1i (si ),
for some transitions {pi (· | si , y)}si,y ⊆ ∆(S i ), and distributions {p(· | a)}a ⊆ ∆(Y ), π1i ∈
∆(S i ), all i ∈ I, and (ii) rewards satisfy, for all i ∈ I, s ∈ S, a ∈ A, r i (s, a) = r i (si , a). The
ﬁrst assumption guarantees that beliefs over state proﬁles are common knowledge throughout
the game, on and oﬀ path. We assume full support: π1i (si ) > 0, pi (ti | si , y) > 0 for all ti , si
and y, but allow p(y | a) = 0.
In Section 6, we extend our analysis to types that are not independent, and/or values
that are not private. In the case of interdependent values, it matters whether players observe
their payoﬀs or not. One can view privately observed payoﬀs as a special case of private
values: simply deﬁne a player’s private state as including his last realized payoﬀ.4 It would
then be natural to allow for a second round of messages at the end of each period –and this
second message could include both the realized payoﬀ and the realized (private) action. In
fact, our main characterization result extends immediately to the case in which monitoring
is private, rather than public; see Section 6 for a discussion.
Monetary transfers are not allowed. We view the stage game as capturing all possible
interactions among players, and there is no diﬃculty in interpreting some actions as monetary
transfers. In this sense, rather than ruling out monetary transfers, what is assumed here is
limited liability (as captured by the boundedness of the action simplex).
The game deﬁned above allows for public communication among players. In doing so,
we follow most of the literature on dynamic Bayesian games, see Athey and Bagwell (2001,
2008), Escobar and Toikka (2013), Renault, Solan and Vieille (2013), etc.5 As in static
Bayesian mechanism design, communication is required for coordination even in the absence
of strategic motives; communication allows us to characterize what restrictions on payoﬀs,
if any, are imposed by non-cooperative behavior.
4

This interpretation is pointed out by AS. See also Mezzetti (2004) for the “static” (two rounds) counterpart.
5
This is not to say that introducing a mediator would be uninteresting. Following Myerson (1986), we
could then appeal to a revelation principle, although without commitment from the players this would simply
shift the inferential problem to the recommendation step of the mediator.
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Throughout, when a period is ﬁxed and understood, we index variables relative to the
previous period with an upper bar (s̄, ā, etc.). Also, when referring to the following period,
we use either t instead of s (for “t”omorrow’s state), or label the variable with a prime.

2.2
2.2.1

Truthful Equilibria
Definition

We now deﬁne the class of Bayes Nash equilibria studied in this paper. This class coincides
with perfect public equilibria (PPE) in repeated games with imperfect public monitoring.
It follows that it is with loss of generality. As for PPE, the deﬁnition is motivated by
tractability, with the hope that the resulting payoﬀ characterization proves to be without
loss under fairly weak conditions on the game.
The set of messages available to the players is an ingredient of the solution concept. Here
and until Section 6, we assume that6
M i = S i.
This is a priori restrictive. Because players cannot commit, the revelation principle does
not apply (see Bester and Strausz, 2001), and richer message sets might lead to larger sets
of equilibrium payoﬀs. Let M := ×i∈I M i .
Furthermore, we focus on equilibria in which players truthfully reveal their private state
in every period, on and oﬀ path. A priori, there is no reason to expect such equilibria to
even exist.
Formal deﬁnitions require additional notation. A public history at the start of round n ≥
1 is a sequence hpub,n = (m1 , y1 , . . . , mn−1 , yn−1) ∈ Hpub,n := (M × Y )n−1 . Player i’s private
history at the start of round n is a sequence hin = (si1 , m1 , ai1 , y1 , . . . , sin−1, mn−1 , ain−1 , yn−1) ∈
Hni := (S i × M × Ai × Y )n−1 . (Here, H1i = Hpub,1 := {∅}.) A (behavior) strategy for
player i is a pair of sequences (mi , ai ) = (min , ain )n∈N with min : Hni × S i → ∆(M i ), and
ain : Hni × S i × M → ∆(Ai ), which specify i’s report and action as a function of his private
information, his current state and the report proﬁle in the current round. Recall however
that a p.r.d. is assumed, although it is omitted from the notation. A strategy proﬁle (m, a)
deﬁnes a distribution over ﬁnite and inﬁnite histories in the usual way.
Definition 1 (Truthful Equilibrium) A strategy (mi , ai ) is truthful if min (hin , sin ) = sin
for all histories hin , n ≥ 1, and ai (hin , sin , mn ) depends on (hpub,n , sin , mn ) only.
6

For clarity, we maintain the notational distinction.
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The ﬁrst requirement imposes players to always report their current state truthfully, after all
histories. The second requires actions to depend on public information (and current state)
only.7
Our analysis makes extensive use of the notion of a policy (or Markov strategy). This is
simply a map ρ : S → ∆(A), interpreted as a (possibly correlated) choice of action given the
vector of states (or reports).
2.2.2

Limitations

To appreciate why truthful equilibria are restrictive, consider a two-player game with perfect
monitoring in which player 1 has two equiprobable states s = t, b, which are i.i.d. over time,
while player 2 has only one state.8 Players have two actions, {T, B} and {L, R}. Further,
suppose that player 1’s payoﬀ from T (resp., B) exceeds his payoﬀ from playing B if the
state is t (resp., b), and that his actions are not observed. Hence, in any truthful equilibrium,
player 1 must play T (resp., B) whenever his state is t (resp., b).
This means that we cannot drive player 2’s payoﬀ below what he can get from taking a
best reply to player 1’s action. If his best-reply is strict, then we could achieve a lower equilibrium payoﬀ by considering a non-truthful equilibrium –player 1 simply does not announce
his state, leaving player 2 guessing what he should do.
It is clear that the argument is more general. Even with i.i.d. states, it is not usually
possible to have a player be indiﬀerent over several actions in more than one particular state
in a truthful equilibrium.9
Hence, asking for truth-telling rules out randomization (in all but at most one state).
Yet randomization is helpful in achieving extremal payoﬀs in repeated games, for at least
two reasons. First, it might be called upon by minmaxing (as in the example above). At the
very least, truthful equilibrium curbs the ability to punish players. Second, it might help
detection of deviations, when monitoring is imperfect, and the monitoring technology does
not have the product structure: it might well be that, for each pure action of player 2, there
are two actions of player 1 that are indistinguishable (in terms of public signals), yet none
would be statistically indistinguishable if only player 2 were to randomize.
Whether or not such randomization is easy to achieve when players do not reveal their
type is irrelevant: What matters for minmaxing or statistical detection of deviations is that
a player’s action be unpredictable, whether this is because he deliberately randomizes over
7

This generalizes the familiar notion of public strategies to Bayesian games.
For the case of i.i.d. states, FL’s algorithm can be adapted, see Section 8 of FLM.
9
In repeated games, players have a unique state, so this problem does not arise.
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actions, or because his type determining his pure action cannot be inferred from his report.
Hence, mixed minmaxing is consistent with a player playing a pure action given his type for
all of them but one, as long as he does not disclose his type.
Given these observations, the next two sections restrict attention to minmaxing strategies
in pure strategies, and to monitoring structures for which randomization does not aﬀect the
scope for statistical detection. In Section 5, we weaken the solution concept to allow for
mixed minmaxing.

2.3

The Revelation Game

The game described in Section 2.1 involves both a choice of report and action. To clarify
the role of the assumptions that we will introduce, it is useful to consider an auxiliary game
in which players make reports, but do not control actions. That is, we are given a map
ρ = (ρn )n∈N , ρn : (M × Y )n → ∆(A), and amend the timing above by replacing step 4 with:
4’ Given the public history (m1 , y1, . . . , mn , yn ), the action proﬁle is drawn according to
ρn (m1 , y1 , . . . , mn , yn ).
The other steps are unchanged. Payoﬀs are deﬁned as before. The deﬁnition of strategies
and of equilibrium is as before, with the obvious restriction to reports. In line with the
previous deﬁnition, an equilibrium of the revelation game is truthful if min (hin , sin ) = sin for
all i ∈ I, hin ∈ Hni , n ≥ 1 and states sin ∈ S i .
We will be interested in the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of the revelation game that can be
achieved for some ρ. Because players only aﬀect actions via messages, the revelation game
dispenses with obedience –in particular, individual rationality. Hence, the set of truthful
equilibrium payoﬀs of the original game is a subset of the set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs
of the revelation game.10

3

Perfect Monitoring, Action-Independent Transitions

This section introduces some of the main ideas within the context of perfect monitoring and
action-independent transitions. This is the case considered by Athey and Bagwell (2008)
and Escobar and Toikka (2013). Proofs for this section are in Appendix A.
10

A priori, this is not obvious for the set of all equilibrium payoﬀs, because in non-truthful equilibria,
actions may depend on states, and not just on reports. Nonetheless, our results below imply that this is the
case.
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We denote by µ ∈ ∆(S ×S) the invariant distribution of two consecutive states (sn , sn+1 ).
Marginals of µ will also be denoted by µ. Our purpose is to describe explicitly the asymptotic
equilibrium payoﬀ set. The feasible (long-run) payoﬀ set is deﬁned as

F := co v ∈ RI | v = Eµ,ρ[r(s, a)], some policy ρ : S → A .

When deﬁning feasible payoﬀs, the restriction to deterministic policies rather than arbitrary
strategies is clearly without loss. Given the public randomization device, F is convex.

3.1

A Superset of Bayes Nash Equilibrium Payoffs

This section provides a benchmark to which the set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs is compared. Namely, we deﬁne a set of payoﬀs that includes the (limit) set of Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀs both in the original game and in the revelation game.
Fix some direction λ ∈ Λ, where Λ := {λ ∈ RI : kλk = 1}. What is the highest score
λ · v that can be achieved over all Bayes Nash equilibrium payoﬀ vectors v?
If actions can be dictated, knowing the state proﬁle can only help. But if λi < 0, this
information would be used against i’s interests. Not surprisingly, player i is unlikely to be
forthcoming about this. This suggests distinguishing players in the set I+ (λ) := {i : λi > 0}
from the others. Suppose that players in I+ (λ) truthfully disclose their private state, while
the remaining players choose a reporting strategy that is independent of their private state.
Deﬁne
k̄(λ) := max Eµ,ρ [λ · r(s, a)] ,
ρ

where the maximum is over all policies ρ : ×i∈I+ (λ) S i → A (with the convention that ρ ∈ A
for I+ (λ) = ∅). Note that Eµ,ρ [λ · r(s, a)] is the long-run payoﬀ vector when players report
truthfully and use the policy ρ. Furthermore, let

V ∗ := ∩λ∈Λ v ∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k̄(λ) .

We call V ∗ the set of incentive-compatible payoﬀs. Clearly, V ∗ ⊆ F . Note also that V ∗
depends on the transition matrix only via the invariant distribution. It turns out that the
set V ∗ is a superset of the set of all equilibrium payoﬀ vectors.
Let NEδ (resp., NEδR ) denote the equilibrium payoﬀs in the original (resp., revelation)
game, given δ ∈ [0, 1).

12

Proposition 1 Assume IPV. The limit sets of Bayes Nash equilibrium payoffs are contained
in V ∗ :
lim sup NEδ ⊆ V ∗ , lim sup NEδR ⊆ V ∗ .
δ→1

δ→1

Proof. This Proposition is implied by Proposition 3, whose proof is in Appendix A. Here
we provide a sketch (for lim supδ→1 NEδ ) in the case in which the initial belief (π1i )i∈I
/ + (λ) is
equal to the ergodic distribution (µi )i∈I
/ + (λ) . Fix λ ∈ Λ. Fix also δ < 1. Consider the Bayes
Nash equilibrium σ = (m, a) of the game (with discount factor δ) with payoﬀ vector v that
maximizes λ · v among all equilibria (where v i is the expected payoﬀ of player i given π1 ).
This equilibrium need not be truthful or in pure strategies. Consider i ∈
/ I+ (λ). Along with
−i
i
σ and π1 , player i’s equilibrium strategy σ deﬁnes a distribution over histories. Fixing σ −i ,
let us consider an alternative strategy σ̃ i where player i’s reports are replaced by realizations
of the public randomization device with the same distribution (round by round, conditional
on the realizations so far), and player i’s action is determined by the randomization device as
well, with the same conditional distribution (given the simulated reports) as would specify
if this had been i’s report.11 The new proﬁle (σ −i , σ̃ i ) need no longer be an equilibrium
of the game. Yet, thanks to the IPV assumption, it gives players −i the same payoﬀ as
σ and, thanks to the equilibrium property, it gives player i a weakly lower payoﬀ. Most
importantly, the strategy proﬁle (σ −i , σ̃ i ) no longer depends on the history of types of player
i. Clearly, this argument can be applied to all players i ∈
/ I+ (λ) simultaneously, so that λ · v
is lower than the maximum inner product achieved over strategies that only depend on the
history of types in I+ (λ). Maximizing this inner product over such strategies is a standard
partially observable Markov decision problem, which admits a solution within the class of
i
deterministic policies (on the state space ×i∈I+ (λ) S i × ×i∈I
/ + (λ) ∆(S )).
i
Because transitions do not depend on actions, the belief pn ∈ ×i∈I
/ + (λ) ∆(S ) in round n
about the states of players in I \ I+ (λ) remains equal at all times to the ergodic distribution
i
(µi )i∈I
/ + (λ) . This deﬁnes a strategy that is only a function of the states (s )i∈I+ (λ) (the solution
of the partially observable Markov decision problem evaluated at the belief (µi )i∈I
/ + (λ) ).

I
Taking δ → 1 yields that the limit set is included in v ∈ R | λ · v ≤ k̄(λ) , and this is
true for all λ ∈ Λ.
11

To be slightly more formal: in a given round, the randomization device selects a report for player i
according to the conditional distribution induced by σ i , given the public history so far. At the same time,
the device selects an action for player i according to the distribution induced by σ i , given the public history,
including reports of players −i and the simulated report for player i. The strategy σ̃ i plays the action
recommended by the device.
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Figure 2: Incentive-compatible and feasible payoﬀ sets in Example 1
As should be clear from the proof, Proposition 1 does not rely on M i = S i and holds for
any message space.
The set V ∗ can be a strict subset of F , as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Each player i = 1, 2 has two states si = si , s̄i . Rewards are given by Figure
1, with c(si ) = 2, c(s̄i ) = 1. (The interpretation is that a pie of total size 6 is obtained if
at least one agent works; if both do only half the amount of work has to be put in by each
worker. Their cost of working is ﬂuctuating.) From one round to the next, a player’s state
changes with probability p, independently across players. Hence, the invariant distribution
assigns equal weight to all four state proﬁles. Given that V ∗ only depends on the transition
matrix via the invariant distribution, the speciﬁc value of p is irrelevant to compute V ∗ and
F , shown in Figure 2.
A set-theoretic lower bound to V ∗ is also readily obtained. Let Extpo denote the (weak)
14

Pareto frontier of F . We write Extpu for the set of payoﬀ vectors obtained from pure stateindependent action proﬁles, i.e. the set of vectors v = Eµ,ρ [r(s, a)] for some ρ that takes a
constant value in A. In their environment, Escobar and Toikka show that all individually
rational (as deﬁned below) payoﬀs in co (Extpu ∪ Extpo ) are equilibrium payoﬀs (whenever
this set has non-empty interior). It follows from our results and theirs that this is a subset
of V ∗ . (In fact, the restriction to individually rational payoﬀs is not needed; it is not hard to
show directly from the deﬁnition of V ∗ that co (Extpu ∪ Extpo ) ⊆ V ∗ .) In Example 1, this
lower bound is tight, but this is not always the case.

3.2

The Average Cost Optimality Equation

Our analysis makes use of the Average Cost Optimality Equation (ACOE) that plays an
important role in dynamic programming. For completeness, we provide here an elementary
statement, which is suﬃcient for our purpose, and we refer to Puterman (1994) for details
and additional properties.
Let be given an irreducible (or more generally unichain) transition function q over the
ﬁnite set S with invariant measure µ, and a payoﬀ function u : S → R.12 Assume that
successive states (sn ) follow a Markov chain with transition function q and that a decisionmaker receives the reward u(sn ) in round n. The long-run payoﬀ of the decision-maker is
v = Eµ [u(s)]. While this long-run payoﬀ is independent of the initial state, discounted payoﬀs
are not. Lemma 1 below provides a normalized measure of the diﬀerences in discounted
payoﬀs, for diﬀerent initial states. Here and in what follows, t stands for the “next” state
proﬁle (“tomorrow” ’s state), given the current state proﬁle s.13
Lemma 1 (ACOE) There is θ : S → R such that
v + θ(s) = u(s) + Et∼q(·|s) θ(t).
As mentioned, the lemma is standard in average cost dynamic programming, but a short
direct proof is provided in the online appendix (appendix E).
12

As is well known, the unichain assumption cannot be relaxed.
Lemma 1 deﬁnes the relative values for an exogenous Markov chain, or equivalently for an arbitrary
policy. It is simply an “accounting” identity. The standard ACOE delivers more, as it provides a way of
identifying the optimal policy: given some Markov decision problem (MDP), a policy ρ is optimal if and
only if, for all states s, ρ(s) maximizes the right-hand side of the equations of Lemma 1. Both results will
be invoked interchangeably.
13
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The map θ is unique, up to an additive constant. It admits an intuitive interpretation in
γδ (s) − γδ (s′ )
,
terms of discounted payoﬀs. Indeed, the diﬀerence θ(s) − θ(s′ ) is equal to lim
δ→1
1−δ
where γδ (s) is the discounted payoﬀ when starting for s. For this reason, following standard
terminology, call θ the (vector of) relative values.
The map θ provides a “one-shot” measure of the relative value of being in a given state;
with persistent and possibly action-dependent transitions, the relative value is an essential
ingredient in converting the dynamic game into a one-shot game, alongside the invariant
measure µ. The former encapsulates the relevant information regarding future payoﬀs, while
the latter is essential in aggregating the diﬀerent one-shot games, parameterized by their
states. Both µ and θ are usually deﬁned as the solutions of a ﬁnite system of equations –the
balance equations and the equations stated in Lemma 1. But in the ergodic case that we
are concerned with, explicit formulas exist. (See, for instance, Iosifescu, 1980, p.123, for the
invariant distribution; and Puterman, 1994, Appendix A for the relative values.)

3.3

Characterization

As mentioned, truthful equilibrium reduces to PPE in the case of repeated games with
public monitoring. FL provide an algorithm to describe the limit set of PPE payoﬀs. Their
characterization of the set of PPE payoﬀ vectors, Eδ , as δ → 1 relies on the notion of a score
deﬁned as follows. Recall that Λ denotes the unit sphere of RI . We refer to λ ∈ Λ (or its
coordinate λi ) as weights, although the coordinates need not be nonnegative.
Definition 2 Fix λ ∈ Λ. Let

k(λ) = sup λ · v,
v,x,α

where the supremum is taken over all v ∈ RI , x : Y → RI and α ∈ ×i∈I ∆(Ai ) such that
(i) α is a Nash equilibrium with payoff v of the game with payoff function r(a) +
a)x(y);

P

y

p(y |

(ii) For all y ∈ Y , it holds that λ · x(y) ≤ 0.
Let H :=

T

λ∈Λ {v

∈ RI | λ · v ≤ k(λ)}. FL prove the following.

Theorem 1 (FL) It holds that Eδ ⊆ H for any δ < 1; moreover, if H has non-empty
interior, then limδ→1 Eδ = H.
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This theorem is extended by HSTV (2011) to the case of stochastic games with observable
states. Our purpose is to obtain an algorithm for truthful equilibrium payoﬀs for the broader
class of games considered here.
Because we insist on truthful equilibria, and because we need to incorporate the dynamic
eﬀects of actions on states, we must consider instead policies ρ : S → ×i∈I ∆(Ai ) and
transfers, such that reporting truthfully and playing ρ constitutes a stationary equilibrium
of the dynamic two-step game augmented with transfers. While policies depend only on
current states, transfers will depend on the previous state and current public outcome.
In what follows, the set of public outcomes in a given round is Ωpub := S × A (where
the S-components stand for the reports). Let a policy ρ : S → ×i∈I ∆(Ai ), and a map x :
S ×Ωpub → RI be given. The vector x(s̄, ωpub ) is to be interpreted as transfers, contingent on
previous reports s̄, and on the current public outcome ωpub .14 Assuming states are truthfully
reported and actions chosen according to ρ, the sequence (ωn ) of outcomes is a unichain
Markov chain, and so is the sequence of pairs of reports (sn−1 , sn ). Let θρ,r+x : S × S → RI
denote the relative values of the players, obtained when applying Lemma 1 to the latter
chain (and to all players).
As FL, we start with an auxiliary one-shot game. We deﬁne Γ(ρ, x) to be the one-shot
Bayesian game with communication where:
(i) ﬁrst, (s̄, s) ∈ S ×S is drawn according to µ; each player i is publicly told s̄ and privately
si ;
(ii) each player i reports publicly some state mi ∈ S i , then chooses an action ai ∈ Ai .
The payoﬀ vector is r(s, a) + x(s̄, ωpub ) + θρ,r+x (m, t), where ωpub := (m, a) and t ∼ p(· | s).
Given λ ∈ Λ, we denote by P0 (λ) the optimization program sup λ·v, where the supremum
is computed over all payoﬀ vectors v ∈ RI , policies ρ : S → ×i∈I ∆(Ai ) and transfers
x : S × Ωpub → RI such that
(a) truth-telling followed by ρ is a PBE outcome of Γ(ρ, x), with expected payoﬀ v;
(b) λ · x(·) ≤ 0.
Condition (a) implies that for all s̄, s ∈ S, the mixed proﬁle ρ(s) is a Nash equilibrium in the
(complete information) game with payoﬀ function r(s, a) + x(s̄, (s, a)) + Et∼p(·|s)θρ,r+x (t). It
puts no restriction on equilibrium behavior following a lie at the report step.
14

Conceptually, it might make sense to condition transfers on previous actions as well. This extension is
not needed when transitions are action-independent.
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The condition that v be the equilibrium payoﬀ in Γ(ρ, x) writes
v = E(s̄,s)∼µ,a∼ρ(s) [r(s, a) + x(s̄, ωpub )] ,
where ωpub = (s, a).
We denote by k0 (λ) the value of P0 (λ), and let H0 := {v ∈ RI , λ·v ≤ k0 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ}
be the convex set with support function k0 .
Theorem 2 below is the exact analog of FLM and HSTV, yet requires a (rather innocuous)
non-degeneracy assumption.
Two states si and s̃i of player i are equivalent if r i (si , ·) = r i (s̃i , ·) + c for some c ∈ R. In
this section, we maintain the assumption that there is no player with two distinct, equivalent
states.
Let T Eδ (T EδR ) denote the set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs in the original (resp.,
revelation) game.
Theorem 2 Assume that H0 has non-empty interior. Then H0 is included in the limit set
of truthful payoffs:
H0 ⊆ lim inf T Eδ .
δ→1

The same result holds true for the revelation game, weakening condition (a) in the deﬁnition of H0 (λ) by dropping the requirement that playing ρ be optimal. Let k0R denote the
corresponding score.
For i ∈ I, deﬁne v i := mina−i ∈A−i maxρi :S i→Ai Eµ [r i (si , (a−i , ρi (si )))].
Proposition 2 For every λ 6= −ei , k0 (λ) = k0R (λ) = k̄(λ).
For λ = −ei , k0 (−ei ) ≥ −v i , and k0R (−ei ) = k̄(−ei ).
Set V ∗∗ := {v ∈ V ∗ , v ≥ v}. By Proposition 2, V ∗∗ ⊆ H0 . Hence Theorem 2 implies the
following.
Corollary 3 (Folk theorem, Special Case) Assume that V ∗ has non-empty interior. Then
lim T EδR = V ∗ .

δ→1

Assume that V ∗∗ has non-empty interior. Then
lim inf T Eδ ⊇ V ∗∗ .
δ→1

This corollary (or Proposition 2) makes clear that the only restriction imposed by truthfulness, if any, lies in the lowest equilibrium payoﬀ that can be attained.
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3.4

Proof overview

Theorem 2 is reminiscent of the characterization of PBE payoﬀs in FLM (see also HSTV),
and the proof in the Appendix follows the logic of existing proofs to the extent possible. Yet,
the combination of private information and of state persistence signiﬁcantly complicates the
analysis. To motivate and introduce our technical innovations, we transpose below the
recursive proof of FLM, and point out where diﬃculties arise, and how to cope with them.
Let Z be a compact set with a smooth boundary contained in the interior of H0 , and
a discount factor δ < 1 be given. Given a target payoﬀ z ∈ Z, we construct recursively a
truthful PBE candidate with payoﬀ z.
Given a target payoﬀ zn ∈ Z in round n, we set a direction λn ∈ RI to be (heuristically)
“the” normal vector to Z at zn , and pick a feasible triple (vn , ρn , xn ) in P0 (λn ) such that
λn · zn < λn · vn . The target payoﬀ is publicly updated in round n + 1 to
1−δ
1−δ
1
vn +
xn (mn−1 , ωpub,n ),
zn+1 := zn −
δ
δ
δ

(1)

where ωpub,n = (mn , yn ) is the public outcome in round n. The equilibrium candidate
σ = (m, a) reports truthfully in round n and selects actions according to ρn .
As in FLM (see also HSTV), the choice of λn and of (vn , ρn , xn ) given zn ensure that zn+1 ∈
Z, so that this recursive construction is well-deﬁned. Moreover, the expected continuation
payoﬀ in round n (computed as of round 1) is Eσ [zn ]. Fix now a history hn up to round n
along which all reports are truthful, with public part hpub,n . The choice of (ρn , xn ) and the
updating formula (1) also ensure that truthful reporting followed by ρn is a truthful PBE
outcome of the Bayesian game15 with payoﬀ (1 − δ)r(sn , an ) + δzn+1 (hpub,n , ωpub,n ) + (1 −
δ)θρn ,r+xn (sn , sn+1 ), and the induced equilibrium payoﬀ is zn (hpub,n ).16
In the FLM setup of repeated games with public monitoring, and in stochastic games
as well, this is suﬃcient to imply that σ is a PPE. For dynamic Bayesian games, it is not
quite enough, even in the setup of this section, as it does not rule out proﬁtable deviations
in round n following hn .
Indeed, under this construction, the pair (ρn , xn ) is updated in round n + 1, and the
actual continuation relative values need not coincide with θρn ,r+xn . Whether a speciﬁc state
reached in round n + 1 is “good” relative to some other state depends on ρn+1 , hence on λn+1
and therefore on an through yn . That is, even though player i’s action choice has no inﬂuence
on the distribution of sin+1 , it does aﬀect the relative values of the diﬀerent states in round
15
16

The prior belief is unambiguously derived from the public history.
That is, when computed under µ.
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n + 1. These changes in relative values would cancel in expectation, if states in round n + 1
were drawn using the invariant measure µ. Yet, player i is computing expectations based
on sin . Hence, (conditional on ωpub,n ), player i’s continuation payoﬀ is not exactly equal to
i
zn+1
(hpub,n , ωpub,n ) and state persistence thus aﬀects the incentives faced by player i.17
In our construction, the above sketch is amended along the following lines. We ﬁrst prove
that any feasible triple (v, ρ, x) in P0 (λ) can be perturbed into some other triple, for which
truth-telling incentives are strict. In other words, the value of P0 (λ) is unchanged when
truth-telling incentives are required to be strict. We then divide the play into a sequence
of phases of random duration. In eﬀect, the p.r.d. chooses in each round with probability
ξ, whether to start a new phase. When a new phase starts, target payoﬀs and policies are
updated according to formulas derived from the FLM ones.
The switching probability ξ is set to be large compared to (1 − δ), so that the expected
contribution of a single phase to the overall payoﬀ is small. Yet, ξ is set to be small, so
that the expected duration of each phase is large.18 The former property ensures that the
recursive procedure is well-deﬁned. The latter one ensures that, in any phase k under the
plan (v(k ), ρ(k) , x(k) ), players perceive future payoﬀs as a small perturbation of the relative
values θρ(k) ,r+x(k) . Given that truth-telling incentives are strict in Γ(ρ(k) , x(k) ), it thus remains
optimal to report truthfully in the dynamic game.

4

Action-dependent Transitions, Imperfect Monitoring

We now generalize these results to the case in which monitoring is imperfect, and actions
aﬀect transitions. The environment is still of independent private values (IPV), which (cf.
Section 2.1) requires that
p(t, y | s, a) = p(y | a) × ×i∈I pi (ti | si , y),
and π1 (s) = ×i∈I π1i (si ).19 Proofs for this section are in Appendix B.
17

The issue does not arise only when successive states are i.i.d. But then the dynamic game is truly the
repetition of a one-shot Bayesian game, to which the results of FLM apply.
ξ(δ)
18
To be clear, we pick ξ(δ) as a function of δ such that limδ→1 ξ(δ) = 0 and lim
= +∞.
δ→1 1 − δ
19
For expositional simplicity, we assume here that states do not aﬀect the signal distribution. There are
important applications for which states do aﬀect the distribution of signals. Theorem 6 below makes no
restriction in this respect. See also the working paper for the analogs of the theorems developed in Sections
4–5 for the case in which states aﬀect signal distributions.
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4.1

The Superset Revisited

Example 2. There are two players. Incomplete information is one-sided: player 2 might
be in state s = 0, 1. Player 2 has a single action, while player 1 chooses action a = 0, 1.
Transitions are given by p(sn+1 = a | sn = s, an = a) = 1/3, for all s = 0, 1. That is,
the state is twice as likely to diﬀer from the previous action chosen by player 1 as it is to
coincide with this choice. As for rewards, r 2 (s, a) = −1 if s = a, = 0 otherwise. Suppose
that the objective is to minimize player 2’s payoﬀ. We note that any constant strategy (i.e.,
a = 0 or a = 1 in all periods) yields a payoﬀ of −1/3, while a strategy that alternates
deterministically between actions has a payoﬀ that tends to −2/3 as δ → 1.
This example demonstrates that constant action choices no longer suﬃce to minimize or
maximize a player’s payoﬀ, when his state is unknown to others and he fails to reveal it,
even as δ → 1. Plainly, in the example, player 1’s belief about the state of player 2 matters
for the choice of an optimal action, and the chosen action matters for player 1’s next belief.
Hence, if we wish to describe player 1’s choice as a Markov policy, we must augment the state
space to account for player 1’s belief. In the previous example, there is a binary suﬃcient
statistic for this belief, namely, the last action chosen by player 1. Yet in general, the role of
the belief is not summarized by such a simple statistic. It is necessary to augment the state
space by (at least) an arbitrary summary statistic, which follows a Markov chain as well.
The next result establishes that ﬁnite representations suﬃce, under our assumptions.20
We need to generalize the notion of a policy. Let a ﬁnite set K, and a map φ : K ×Y → K
be given. Together with φ, any map ρ : S ×K → ∆(A) induces a Markov chain (sn , kn , an , yn )
over S × K × A × Y . We refer to such a triple ρext = (ρ, K, φ) as an extended policy. An
extended policy is thus a policy that is possibly contingent on a public, extraneous and
payoﬀ irrelevant variable k whose evolution is dictated by y. The extended policy ρext is
irreducible if the latter chain is irreducible. We then denote by µρext ∈ ∆((S × K × A × Y )2 )
the invariant distribution of successive states, actions and signals. Again, we will still denote
by µρext various marginals of µρext .
Given a direction λ ∈ Λ, let as before I+ (λ) = {i ∈ I, λi > 0}. We then set k̄1 (λ) :=
supρext Eµρext [λ · r(s, a)], where the supremum is taken over all pure irreducible extended
policies ρext = (ρ, K, φ) such that ρ : S × K → A depends on s only through its components
si , i ∈ I+ (λ).
Let then V1∗ := {v ∈ RI , λ · v ≤ k̄1 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ}, and denote by NEδ (π1 ) the set of
Nash equilibrium equilibrium payoﬀs of the game with discount factor δ, as a function of the
20

This is closely related to the literature on ﬁnite-state controllers in POMDP, see Yu and Bertsekas (2008).
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initial distribution π1 .
Proposition 3 Assume IPV. Then lim supδ→1 NEδ (π1 ) ⊆ V1∗ , for all π1 .21

4.2

Characterization

Given an irreducible extended policy ρext = (ρ, K, φ), the relevant set of public outcomes
is Ωpub = S × K × Y , where elements of S have to be interpreted as reports. Let a map
xext : Ωpub × Ωpub → RI be given. The vector x(ω̄pub , ωpub ) is interpreted as transfers,
contingent on the public outcomes in the previous and current rounds. Relative values
associated with the pair (ρext , xext ) are thus maps θρext ,r+xext : Ωpub × S × K → RI .
We then deﬁne Γ(ρext , xext ) to be the one-shot Bayesian game with communication where
(i) (ω̄pub , s, k) ∈ Ωpub × S × K is ﬁrst drawn according to µρext , (ii) each player i is publicly
told ω̄pub (from which he deduces k = φ(k̄, ȳ)) and privately told si , publicly reports some
state mi ∈ S i , then chooses an action ai ∈ Ai , and the payoﬀ vector is
r(s, a) + xext (ω̄pub , ωpub ) + E(y,t)∼p(·|s,a) θρext ,r+xext (ωpub , t),
with ωpub = (m, k, y).
Given λ ∈ Λ, we denote by P1 (λ) the optimization program sup λ·v, where the supremum
is over payoﬀs v ∈ RI , extended policies ρext = (ρ, K, φ) and transfers xext : Ωpub × Ωpub →
RI , such that
(a) truth-telling followed by ρ is a perfect Bayesian outcome of Γ(ρext , xext ) with expected
payoﬀ v;
(b) λ · xext (·) ≤ 0.
We denote by k1 (λ) the value of P1 (λ), and by k1R (λ) the corresponding value when the
requirement that obedience (namely, following ρ) be optimal is dropped.
As in the case of action-independent transitions and perfect monitoring, we prove our
characterization result, Theorem 4 below, under a non-degeneracy assumption on payoﬀs,
which we now introduce.
Given an action proﬁle a ∈ A, let ~a be the policy which plays a in each state proﬁle
s ∈ S. Observe that for i ∈ I and s ∈ S, the relative value θ~ai ,r (s) is independent of s−i
under IPV.
21

A more precise statement holds. For each η > 0, there is δ̄ < 1 such that, for each discount factor δ ≥ δ̄
∗
and each initial distribution π1 ∈ ×i∈I ∆(S i ), N Eδ (π1 ) is included in the η-neighborhood V1,η
of V1∗ .
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A1 For all i ∈ I, si 6= s̃i ∈ S i , there exist action proﬁles a, b ∈ A, such that
i
i
θ~ai ,r (si ) − θ~b,r
(si ) 6= θ~ai ,r (s̃i ) − θ~b,r
(s̃i ).

(2)

When successive states are i.i.d., A1 is equivalent to the assumption of no-two-equivalent
states made in Section 3.3. However, when A1 is specialized to the case of action-independent
states, it neither implies nor is implied by this assumption.22
In addition, we require the usual identiﬁability condition. In A2, p refers to the marginal
distribution over signals y ∈ Y only. Let Qi (a) := {p(· | âi , a−i ) : âi 6= ai } be the distributions
over signals y induced by a unilateral deviation by i at the action step, whether or not
the reported state si corresponds to the true state ŝi or not. For simplicity, we make the
assumption on all action proﬁles, rather than on the relevant subset.
A2 For all a ∈ A,
1. For all i 6= j, p(· | a) ∈
/ co {Qi (a) ∪ Qj (a)}.

2. For all i 6= j, co (p(· | a) ∪ Qi (a)) ∩ co (p(· | a) ∪ Qj (a)) = {p(· | a)}.

For i ∈ I, we set v i := mina−i ∈A−i maxρi :S i→Ai E(s,a)∼µ(ρi ,a−i ) [r i (s, a)] .23 Proposition 4 and
Theorem 4 parallel the results of Section 3.3.
Proposition 4 Assume IPV. Then k1R (λ) ≥ k̄1 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ. Furthermore, under A2,
k1 (−ei ) ≥ −v i and k1 (λ) = k̄1 (λ) for all λ 6= −ei .
Theorem 4 (Folk theorem) Assume that IPV and Assumption A1. If V1∗ has nonempty
interior, then, for any π1 ,
lim T EδR (π1 ) = V1∗ .
δ→1

If additionally Assumption A2 hold, and V1∗∗ has non-empty interior, then
lim inf T Eδ (π1 ) ⊇ V1∗∗ .
δ→1

This theorem highlights once again that, under IPV, truth-telling is only restrictive as far as
obedience goes: Assumption A2 ensures that deviations can be statistically detected, and
the candidate payoﬀ set must be truncated given individual rationality.
22

Yet, all results below still hold when A1 is weakened and it is only required that (2) holds for some
sequences ~a = (an )n and ~b = (bn ) in A –at the cost of a slight extension of the notion of relative value,
and of notational complexity. The weakened assumption is strictly weaker than both A1 and the no-twoequivalent-states assumption.
23
This deﬁnition of minmax can be strengthened by considering extended policies for players −i. All
results remain valid with this change.
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5

Product Monitoring

This section strengthens the assumption A2 on monitoring and considers a slightly larger
class of equilibria. By doing so, we obtain an exact characterization of the asymptotic (Nash)
equilibrium payoﬀ set.
The reason why previous theorems failed to be characterizations is because of the minmax
payoﬀ. As mentioned, there are many examples in which the state-independent pure-strategy
minmax payoﬀ vi coincides with the “true” minmax payoﬀ
h
i
X
w i := lim min max E (1 − δ)
δ n−1 rni ,
δ→1 σ−i

n≥1

σi

where the minimum is over the set of (independent) strategies by players −i. But the two
do not coincide for all examples of economic interest. First, the state-independent purestrategy minmax payoﬀ rules out mixed strategies. Yet mixed strategies play a key role in
some applications, e.g. the literature on auditing, corruption, etc. (starting with Becker and
Stigler, 1974). More disturbingly, when v i > w i , it can happen that V1∗∗ = ∅. Theorem 4
becomes meaningless, as the corresponding equilibria no longer exist. On the other hand,
the set

W := v ∈ V1∗ | v i ≥ w i for all i

is never empty.24
As is also well known, even when attention is restricted to repeated games, there is
no reason to expect the punishment level w i to equal the mixed-strategy minmax payoﬀ
commonly used (that lies in between w i and vi ), as w i might only be obtained when players
−i use private strategies (depending on past action choices) that would allow for harder,
coordinated punishments than those assumed in the deﬁnition of the mixed-strategy minmax
payoﬀ. Private histories may allow players −i to correlate play unbeknownst to i. One special
case in which they do coincide is when monitoring has a product structure, which rules out
such correlation.25 As this is the class of monitoring structures for which the standard folk
theorem for repeated games is a characterization of (as opposed to a lower bound on) the
equilibrium payoﬀ set, we maintain this assumption throughout this section.
24

To see this, note that the state-independent mixed minmax payoﬀ lies (weakly) below the Pareto-frontier:
clearly, the score in direction λe = √1I (1, . . . , 1) of the payoﬀ vector minα−i maxρi :S i →Ai E[ri (si , a)] is less
than k(λe ).
25
The scope for wi to coincide with the mixed minmax payoﬀ is slightly larger, but not by much. See
Gossner and Hörner (2010) for a characterization.
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Definition 3 Monitoring has product structure if there are finite sets (Y i )Ii=1 such that Y =
×i Y i , and
p(y | a) = ×i pi (y i | ai ),
for all y = (y 1 , . . . , y I ) ∈ Y , all a ∈ A.
As shown by FLM, product structure ensures that identiﬁability is implied by detectability,
and that no further assumptions are required on the monitoring structure to enforce payoﬀs
on the Pareto-frontier, hence to obtain a “Nash-threat” theorem. Our goal is to achieve
a characterization of the equilibrium payoﬀ set, so that an assumption on the monitoring
structure remains necessary. We make the following assumption, which could certainly be
reﬁned.
A3 For all i, a,
p(· | a) ∈
/ co Qi (a).
Note that, given product structure, Assumption A3 is an assumption on pi only.
We maintain the non-degeneracy assumption introduced in Section 4.2. In the appendix
C (with additional details in online Appendix F), we prove that W characterizes the (Bayes
Nash, as well as sequential) equilibrium payoﬀ set as δ → 1 in the IPV case. More formally:
Theorem 5 Assume that monitoring has the product structure, and that Assumptions A1
and A3 hold. If W has non-empty interior, the set of (Nash, sequential) equilibrium payoffs
converges to W as δ → 1.
Because minmaxing requires unpredictability, and as explained in Section 2.2, unpredictability might be inconsistent with truthful equilibria, this requires using strategies that
are not truthful, at least during “punishments.” 26 Nonetheless, we show that a slight extension of the set of strategies considered so far, to allow for silent play during punishment-like
phases, suﬃces.
Unlike in repeated games, imposing product structure does not guarantee that the minmax strategy is stationary: players −i draw inferences from the public signal y i about player
i’s action, hence about his private state, which can be exploited to adjust their action. Our
construction relies on an extension of Theorem 2, as well as an argument inspired by Gossner
26

We use quotation marks as there are no clearly deﬁned punishment phases in recursive constructions
(as in Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti, 1990, or here), unlike in the standard proof of the folk theorem under
perfect monitoring.
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(1995), based on approachability theory (Blackwell, 1956). Roughly speaking, the argument
is divided in two parts. First, we extend Theorem 2 to allow for “blocks” of T rounds, rather
than single rounds, as the extensive form over which the score is computed. Considering
such a block in which player i, say, is “punished” (that is, a block corresponding to the direction −ei ), one must devise transfers x at the end of the block, as a function of the public
history, that makes players −i willing to play the minmax strategy, or at least some strategy
proﬁle achieving approximately the same payoﬀ to player i. The diﬃculty is that typically
there are no transfers making player i indiﬀerent over a subset of actions for diﬀerent types
of his simultaneously; yet minmaxing might require precisely as much. To ensure that the
distribution over action proﬁles during the punishment phase matches the theoretical one
(computed using the realized actions taken by player i), we design a statistical test that
a player j 6= i can pass with high probability (by conforming to the minmax strategy, for
instance), independently of the other players’ strategies; and that he is very likely to fail
if the distribution of his realized signals departs too much from the one that his minmax
strategy would yield.27 When testing player j, it is critical to condition on player i’s realized
signal, so as to incentivize player j to be unpredictable.

6

Dropping the IPV Assumption

The IPV assumption simpliﬁes the analysis considerably. Yet neither the independence
nor the private values assumption are necessary to derive a result in the spirit of Theorem
2. Several complications arise, which reﬂect both new opportunities and diﬃculties. With
correlated states, for instance, one might like to use player −i’s reports as statistical evidence
in evaluating the truthfulness of player i’s report, which suggests expanding the domain of
transfers of the one-shot Bayesian game, and making it easier to induce truth-telling. On
the other hand, under common values, player i’s payoﬀ is no longer independent of player
−i’s state, conditional on the marginal distribution of player −i’s action. Hence, ﬁxing
this marginal distribution, player i’s incentives depend on whether player −i reports his
state truthfully, which might make truth-telling harder to sustain. The next two examples
illustrate.
Example 3—A Silent Game. This game follows Renault (2006). This is a zero-sum
two-player game in which player 1 has two private states, s1 and ŝ1 , and player 2 has a single
27

This is where the IPV assumption and product monitoring are used. It ensures that player j’s minmax
strategy can be taken to be independent of his private information, hence adapted to the public information.
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state, omitted. Player 1 has actions A1 = {T, B} and player 2 has actions A2 = {L, R}.
Player 1’s reward is given by Figure 1. Recall that rewards are not observed. States s1

T
B

L
1
0

R
0
0

T
B

s1

L
0
0

R
0
1
ŝ1

Figure 3: Player 1’s reward in Example 3
and ŝ1 are equally likely in the initial round, and transitions are action-independent, with
p ∈ [1/2, 1) denoting the probability that the state remains unchanged from one round to
the next.
Pick M 1 such that #M 1 ≥ 2, so that player 1 can disclose his state if he wishes. Will he?
If player 1 reveals the state, player 2 can secure a payoﬀ of 0 by playing R or L depending on
player 1’s report. Yet player 1 can secure 1/4 by choosing reports and actions at random. In
fact, this is the (uniform) value for p = 1 (Aumann and Maschler, 1995). When p < 1, player
1 can get more than this by trading oﬀ the higher expected reward from a given action with
the information that it gives away (for instance, he can play T (B) with probability close
to but above 1/2 when the state is s1 (ŝ1 ) so as to leave some uncertainty, yet repeat some
beneﬁts). He has no interest in giving this information away for free through informative
reports. Truthful equilibria do not exist: all equilibria are babbling.
Just because we may focus on the silent game does not make it easier. Its (limit) value
for arbitrary p > 2/3 is still unknown.28 Because the optimal strategies depend on player
2’s belief about player 1’s state, the problem of solving for them is inﬁnite-dimensional, and
all that can be done is to characterize its solution via some functional equation (see Hörner,
Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille, 2010).
Non-existence of truthful equilibria in some games is no surprise. The tension between
truth-telling and lack of commitment also arises in bargaining and contracting, giving rise to
the ratchet eﬀect (see Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985). What Example 1 illustrates is
that small message spaces are just as diﬃcult to deal with as larger ones. When players hide
their information, their behavior reﬂects their private beliefs, which calls for a state space
as large as it gets.
28

It is known for p ∈ [1/2, 2/3] and some speciﬁc values. Pęski and Toikka (2014) have recently shown
that this value is non-increasing in p, and Bressaud and Quas (2014) have determined the optimal strategies
for values of p up to ∼ .7323.
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Example 4—Waiting for Evidence. There are two players. Player 1 has K + 1 types,
S 1 = {0, 1, . . . , K}; player 2 has only two types, S 2 = {0, 1}. Transitions do not depend
on actions (omitted), and are as follows. If s1n = k > 0, then s2n = 0 and s1n+1 = s1n − 1.
If s1n = 0, then s2n = 1 and s1n+1 is drawn randomly (and uniformly) from S 1 . In words, s1n
stands for the number of rounds until the next occurrence of s2 = 1. By waiting no more
than K rounds, all reports by player 1 can be veriﬁed.
This example makes two related points. First, in order for player −i to statistically
discriminate between player i’s states, while simultaneously guaranteeing a given interim
payoﬀ to each player’s type, it is not necessary that his set of signals (here, players −i’s
states) be as rich as player i’s, unlike in static mechanism design with correlated types (the
familiar “spanning condition” of Crémer and McLean (1988), generically satisﬁed if only
if #S −i ≥ #S i ). Two states for one player can be enough to cross-check the reports of
an opponent with many more states, provided that states in later rounds are informative
enough.
Second, the long-term dependence of the stochastic process implies that one player’s
report should not always be evaluated on the ﬂy. It is better to hold oﬀ until more evidence
is collected. Note that this is not the same kind of delay as the one that makes review
strategies eﬀective, taking advantage of the central limit theorem to devise powerful tests
even when signals are independently distributed over time (see Radner, 1986; Fang and
Norman, 2006; Jackson and Sonnenschein, 2007). It is precisely because of the dependence
that waiting is useful here.
This raises an interesting statistical question: does the tail of the sequence of private
states of player −i contain indispensable information in evaluating the truthfulness of player
i’s report in a given round, or is the distribution of this inﬁnite sequence, conditional on
(sin , sn−1 ), summarized by the distribution of an initial segment of the sequence? This
question appears to be open in general. In the case of transitions that do not depend
on actions, it has been raised by Blackwell and Koopmans (1957) and answered by Gilbert
29
(1959): it is enough to consider the next 2#S i + 1 values of the sequence (s−i
n′ )n′ ≥n .
At the very least, when types are correlated and the Markov chain exhibits time dependence, it is useful to condition player i’s continuation payoﬀ given his report about sin on
−i’s next private state, s−i
n+1 . Because this suﬃces to obtain suﬃcient conditions analogous
29

The reporting strategy deﬁnes a hidden Markov chain on pairs of states, reports and signals that induces
a stationary process over reports and signals; Gilbert assumes that the hidden Markov chain is irreducible
and aperiodic, which here need not be (with truthful reporting, the report is equal to the state), but his
result continues to hold when these assumptions are dropped, see for instance Dharmadhikari (1963).
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to those invoked in the static case, we limit ourselves to this conditioning in this section.30

6.1

A General Theorem

We now return to the general model, without restricting attention to either private values or
independent types. In this section, M i := S i × Ai × S i for all i. This has to be interpreted as
player i’s state yesterday, his action yesterday, and his state today. In the spirit of Myerson
(1986), we wish to allow player i to disclose all information that is relevant to his preferences
and beliefs; in this case, with correlated types, his belief about −i’s type proﬁle depends on
the action he has taken, his type yesterday and his current type. Oﬀ path, none of these
are known, and a player shouldn’t ﬁnd it impossible to disclose his beliefs if he happened to
deviate in the previous round.
A proﬁle m of reports is written m = (mp , ma , mc ), where mp (resp. mc ) is interpreted
as the report proﬁle on previous (resp. current) states, and ma is the reported (last round)
action proﬁle.
We set Ωpub := M × Y , and we refer to the pair (mn , yn ) as the public outcome of round
n. This is the additional public information available at the end of round n. We also refer
to (sn , mn , an , yn ) as the outcome of round n, and denote by Ω := Ωpub × S × A the set of
possible outcomes in any given round.
Let a policy ρ : S → ∆(A), and a map (interpreted as transfer) x : Ωpub × Ωpub × S → RI
be given. We will assume that for each i ∈ I, xi (ω̄pub , ωpub , t) is independent of i’s own state
ti .This requirement will not be systematically stated, but it is assumed throughout. Note
that, compared to IPV, we have added the current state proﬁle t−i as an argument of player
i’s transfer, given that this proﬁle is statistical evidence about player i’s state, as explained
in Example 4.
Assuming states are truthfully reported and actions chosen according to ρ, the sequence
(ωn ) of outcomes is a unichain Markov chain, and so is the sequence (ω̃n ), where ω̃n =
(ωpub,n−1 , mn ), with transition function denoted πρ , and with invariant measure µρ .
Let θρ,r+x : Ωpub × M → RI denote the relative values of the players, obtained when
applying Lemma 1 to the latter chain (and to all players).31
30

See Obara (2008) for some of the diﬃculties encountered in dynamic settings when attempting to extend
results from static mechanism design with correlated types.
31
There is here a slight and innocuous abuse of notation: θρ,r+x solves the equations v + θ(ω̄pub , m) =
r(s, ρ(s)) + E[x(ω̄pub , ωpub, t) + θ(ωpub , m′ )], where v = Eµρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub, t)] is the long-run payoﬀ
under ρ.
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Thanks to the ACOE, the condition that reporting truthfully and playing ρ is a stationary
equilibrium of the dynamic game with stage payoﬀs r + x can to some extent be rephrased
as saying that, for each ω̄pub ∈ Ωpub , reporting truthfully and playing ρ is an equilibrium in
the one-shot Bayesian game in which states s are drawn according to p (given ω̄pub ), players
submit reports m, then choose actions a, and obtain the (random) payoﬀ
r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m′ ),
where (y, t) are chosen according to p(· | s, a) and ωpub = (m, y), and m′ is the truthful
report tomorrow determined by t. Here, one should interpret ω̄pub as the public information
from yesterday.
However, because we insist on oﬀ-path truth-telling, we need to consider arbitrary private
histories, and the formal condition is therefore more involved. Fix a player i. Given a triple
i
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ), let Dρ,x
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ) denote the two-step decision problem in which
Step 1 s ∈ S is drawn according to the belief held by player i;32 player i is informed of si ,
then submits a report mi ∈ M i ;
−i −i
Step 2 player i learns current states s−i from the opponents’ reports m−i = (m̄−i
c , ā , s ),
and then chooses an action ai ∈ Ai . The payoﬀ to player i is given by
i
r i (s, a) + xi (ω̄pub , ωpub , t−i ) + θρ,r+x
(ωpub , m′ ),

(3)

where a−i is drawn according to ρ−i (s−i , mic ), the pair (y, t) is drawn according to
p(· | s, a), and ωpub := (m, y).
i
i
We denote by Dρ,x
the collection of decision problems Dρ,x
(ω̄pub , s̄i , āi ).

i
Definition 4 The pair (ρ, x) is admissible if all optimal strategies of player i in Dρ,x
report
truthfully mi = (s̄i , āi , si ) in Step 1 (Truth-telling); then, in Step 2, conditional on all players reporting truthfully in Step 1, ρi (s) is a (not necessarily unique) optimal mixed action
(Obedience).

Recall that player i assumes that players −i report truthfully and play ρ−i . Hence player i assigns
−i
probability 1 to s̄−i = m̄−i
c , and to previous actions being drawn according to ρ (m̄c ); hence this belief
assigns to s ∈ S the probability p(s | ȳ, s̄, ρ(s̄))). This is the case unless ȳ is inconsistent with ρ−i (m̄c ); if
this is the case, use the same updating rule with some other arbitrary ã−i that is consistent with ȳ.
32

30

Some comments are in order. The condition that ρ be played once states (not necessarily
types) have been reported truthfully simply means that, for each ω̄pub and m = (s̄, ā, s) the
action proﬁle ρ(s) is an equilibrium of the complete information one-shot game with payoﬀ
function r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m′ ).
The truth-telling condition is slightly more delicate to interpret. Consider ﬁrst an outcome ω̄ ∈ Ω such that s̄i = m̄ic and āi = ρi (s̄) for all i –no player has lied or deviated in the
previous round, assuming the action to be played was pure. Given such an outcome, all players share the same belief over next types, given by p(· | ȳ, s̄, ā). Consider the Bayesian game
in which (i) s ∈ S is drawn according to the latter distribution, (ii) players make reports m,
then choose actions a, and (iii) get the payoﬀ r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t) + θρ,r+x (ωpub , m′ ). The
admissibility condition for such an outcome ω̄ is equivalent to requiring that truth-telling
followed by ρ is an equilibrium of this Bayesian game, with “strict” incentives at the reporting
step.33
The admissibility requirement in Deﬁnition 4 is demanding, however, in that it requires
in addition truth-telling to be optimal for player i at any outcome ω̄ such that (s̄−i , ā−i ) =
−i
i
i
i
i
(m̄−i
c , ρ (m̄c )), but s̄ 6= m̄c (or ā 6= ρ (m̄c )). Following such outcomes, players do not share
the same belief over the next states. The same issue arises if the action proﬁle ρi (m̄c ) is
mixed. Therefore, it is inconvenient to state the admissibility requirement by means of a
simple, subjective Bayesian game –hence the formulation in terms of a decision problem.
In loose terms, truth-telling is the unique best-reply at the reporting step of player i to
truth-telling and ρ−i . Note that we require truth-telling to be optimal (mi = (s̄i , āi , si )) even
if player i did misreport his previous state (m̄ic 6= s̄i ). On the other hand, Deﬁnition 4 puts
no restriction on player i’s behavior if he lies in Step 1 (mi 6= (s̄i , āi , si )). The second part
of Deﬁnition 4 is equivalent to saying that ρi (s) is one best-reply to ρ−i (s) in the complete
information game with payoﬀ function given by (3) when m = (s̄, ā, s).
The requirement that truth-telling be uniquely optimal reﬂects an important diﬀerence
between our approach to Bayesian games and the traditional approach of Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1990) in repeated games. In the case of repeated games, continuation play
is summarized by the continuation payoﬀ. Here, the future does not only aﬀect incentives
via the long-run continuation payoﬀ, but also via the relative values. However, we do not
know of a simple relationship between v and θ. Our construction involves “repeated games”
strategies that are “approximately” policies, so that θ can be derived from (ρ, x). This
shifts the emphasis from payoﬀs to policies, and requires us to implement a speciﬁc policy.
33

Quotation marks are needed, since we have not deﬁned oﬀ-path behavior. What we mean is that any
on-path deviation at the reporting step leads to a lower payoﬀ, no matter what action is then taken.
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Truth-telling incentives must be strict for the approximation involved not to aﬀect them.34
We denote by C2 the set of admissible pairs (ρ, x).
For given weights λ ∈ Λ, we denote by P2 (λ) the optimization program sup λ · v, where
the supremum is taken over all triples (v, ρ, x) such that
- (ρ, x) ∈ C2 ;
- λ · x(·) ≤ 0;
- v = Eµρ [r(s, a) + x(ω̄pub , ωpub , t)], where µρ ∈ ∆(Ωpub × Ωpub × S) is the invariant
distribution under truth-telling and ρ, so that v is the long-run payoﬀ induced by
(ρ, x).
The three conditions mirror those of Deﬁnition 2 for the case of repeated games. The ﬁrst
condition (admissibility) and the third condition are the counterparts of the Nash condition
in Deﬁnition 2(i); the second condition is the “budget-balance” requirement imposed by
Deﬁnition 2(ii). We denote by k2 (λ) the value of P2 (λ) and set H2 := {v ∈ RI , λ · v ≤
k2 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ}.
Theorem 6 Assume that H2 has non-empty interior. Then, given π1 ,
H2 ⊆ lim inf T Eδ (π1 ).
δ→1

This result (proved in Appendix D) is simple enough. For instance, in the case of “standard” repeated games with public monitoring, Theorem 6 generalizes FLM, yielding the folk
theorem with the mixed minmax under their assumptions.
To be clear, there is no reason to expect Theorem 6 to provide a characterization of the
entire limit set of truthful equilibrium payoﬀs. One might hope to achieve a larger set of
payoﬀs by employing ﬁner statistical tests (using the serial correlation in states, for instance),
just as one can achieve a bigger set of equilibrium payoﬀs in repeated games than the set
of PPE payoﬀs, by considering statistical tests (and private strategies). Example 4 makes
plain that using only the current report of −i as evidence for player i’s truthfulness is ad
hoc. Allowing for more signals/reports comes at an obvious cost in terms of the simplicity
of the characterization.
Nonetheless, as we have shown in Sections 3–5, variants of this theorem suﬃce to establish
“folk theorems” under IPV. Similarly, with correlated types, one can use arguments based
34

Fortunately, this requirement is not demanding, as it is implied by standard full-rank conditions in the
correlated case, and by our non-degeneracy condition in the IPV case.
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on Crémer and McLean (1988) and Kosenok and Severinov (2008) to derive a folk theorem
with appropriate full rank assumptions. See the working paper for details. But Example
3 illustrates the diﬃculties that arise under the ominous combination of independent types
and common values.
Two variations to this theorem are worth mentioning. First, Theorem 6 can be adapted
to the case in which some of the players are short-run, whether or not such players have
private information (in which case, assume that it is independent across rounds). As this is
a standard feature of such characterizations (see FL, for instance), we will be brief. Suppose
that players i ∈ LR = {1, . . . , L}, L ≤ I are long-run players, whose preferences are as
before, with discount factor δ < 1. Players j ∈ SR = {L + 1, . . . , I} are short-run players,
each representative of which plays only once. We consider a “Stackelberg” structure, common
in economic applications, in which long-run players make their reports ﬁrst, thereupon the
short-run players do as well (if they have any private information), and we set M i = S i
for the short-run players. Actions are simultaneous. Let mLR ∈ M LR = ×Li=1 M i denote
an arbitrary report by the long-run players. Given a policy ρLR : M → ×i∈LR ∆(Ai ) of the
long-run players, mapping reports m = (mLR , sSR ) (with sSR = (sL+1 , . . . , sI )) into mixed
actions, we let B(mLR , ρLR ) denote the best-reply correspondence of the short-run players,
namely, the sequential equilibria of the two-step game (reports and actions) between players
in SR. We then modify the deﬁnition of admissible pair (ρ, x) so as to require that the
reports and actions of the short-run players be in B(mLR , ρLR ) for all reports mLR by the
long-run players, where ρLR is the restriction of ρ to players in LR. The requirements on
the long-run players are the same as in Deﬁnition 4.
Second, signals can be private. That is, we may replace Step 2 of the decision problem
i
Dρ,x
by: A proﬁle yn = (yni ) ∈ Y := ×i Y i of private signals and the next state proﬁle
sn+1 = (sin+1 )i∈I are drawn according to some joint distribution psn ,an ∈ ∆(S × Y ). We then
re-deﬁne a message mi as including: player i’s state, action and signal in the last period, and
player i’s current state. Transfers are then assumed to depend on the past, current and next
message proﬁle, with the restriction, as with public monitoring, that player i’s transfer does
not depend on his own future message, only on player −i’s. The deﬁnition of admissibility
is unchanged, given the re-deﬁned message space, and so does the statement of the theorem.
In a sense, this more general formulation is more natural, as the current one already
reduces the program to a one-player decision-theoretic problem, in which each player reports
his private information; he might as well report the signal he observed, and his realized reward, in case of known-own payoﬀs. This variation mirrors Kandori and Matsushima (1998)’s
extension of FLM to private monitoring; the issues they raise regarding the possibility of a
33

folk theorem in truthful strategies under imperfect monitoring apply here as well.

7

Conclusion

This paper has considered a class of equilibria in games with private and imperfectly persistent information. While the structure of equilibria has been assumed to be relatively simple,
to preserve tractability –in particular, we have mostly focused on truthful equilibria– it has
been shown, perhaps surprisingly, that in the case of independent private values this is not
restrictive as far as incentives go: all that transfers depend on are the current and the previous report. This conﬁrms a rather natural intuition: in terms of equilibrium payoﬀs at least
(and as far as incentive-compatibility is concerned), there is nothing to gain from aggregating information beyond transition counts. In the case of correlated values, we have shown
how the standard insights from static mechanism design with correlated values generalize; in
this case as well, the standard “genericity” conditions (in terms of numbers of states) suﬃce,
provided next round’s reports by a player’s opponent are used.
Open questions remain. As explained, the payoﬀ set identiﬁed in Theorem 6 is a subset
of the set of truthful equilibria. As our characterization in the IPV case when monitoring has
a product structure makes clear, this theorem can be extended to yield equilibrium payoﬀ
sets that are larger than the truthful equilibrium payoﬀ set, but without such tweaking, it is
unclear how large the gap is. If possible, an exact characterization of the truthful equilibrium
payoﬀ set (as δ → 1) would be very useful. In particular, this would provide us with a better
understanding of the circumstances under which existence obtains. It is striking that it does
in the two important cases that are well-understood in the static case: independent private
values and correlated types. Given how little is known in static mechanism design when
neither assumption is satisﬁed, perhaps one should not hope for too much in the dynamic
case. Instead, one might hope to prove directly that such equilibria exist in large classes
of games, such as games with known-own payoﬀs (private values, without the independence
assumption).
A diﬀerent but equally important question is what can be said about the dynamic
Bayesian game under alternative assumptions on the communication opportunities. At one
extreme, one might like to know what can be achieved without communication; at the other
extreme, how to extend the analysis to the case in which a mediator is available.
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A

Proofs for Section 3

Here and in what follows, we focus on the statements involving truthful equilibria, i.e.,
accounting for the obedience constraints. The corresponding results for the revelation game
are immediate corollaries.

A.1

Proof of Theorem 2

We let Z be a compact convex set included in the interior of H0 . Given z ∈ Z, we construct
a truthful PBE σ with payoﬀ z. Under σ, the play is divided into a sequence of phases
of random duration. During any given phase, the players (report truthfully and) follow a
policy ρλ : S → A that depends on a direction λ ∈ Λ. Players are incentivized to report
truthfully and to follow the prescribed policy by means of “transfers,” which are implemented
via adjustments in the continuation payoﬀ, updated at the beginning of each phase.
A.1.1

Preliminaries

We pick η > 0 small enough so that the η-neighborhood Zη := {z ∈ RI , d(z, Z) ≤ η} is also
included in the interior of H0 . Since k0 is lower semi-continuous, there exists ε0 > 0 such
that maxz∈Zη λ · z + 2ε0 < k0 (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ.
We quote without proof a classical result, which relies on the smoothness of Zη (see
Lemma 6 in HSTV for a related statement).
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Lemma 2 Given ε > 0, there exists ζ̄ > 0 such that the following holds. For every z ∈ Zη ,
there exists a direction λ ∈ Λ such that any vector w ∈ RI which satisfies kw − zk ≤ ζ and
λ · w ≤ λ · z − εζ for some ζ < ζ̄, belongs to Zη .
The equilibrium construction relies on Lemma 3 below.
Lemma 3 There is a finite set S of triples (v, ρ, x) such that the following holds. For every
direction λ ∈ Λ, there is an element (v, ρ, x) of S such that (i) (v, ρ, x) is feasible in P0 (λ)
with strict truth-telling incentives and (ii) maxz∈Zη λ · z + ε0 < λ · v.
Proof. For each player i ∈ I, and any two states si , s̃i ∈ S i , there exist a, b ∈ A such that
r i (si , a) − r i (si , b) > r i (s̃i , a) − r i (s̃i , b). This implies the existence of a family of correlated
distributions ρi (si ) ∈ ∆(A) (si ∈ S i ), and of a map xi : S i → R such that
r i (si , ρi (s̃i )) + xi (s̃i ) < r i (si , ρi (si )) + xi (si ),
for every si 6= s̃i (see Lemma 2 in Abreu, Dutta and Smith (1994)).
1 X
ρi (si ) and xt : S → RI as xit (s) :=
We next deﬁne ρ∗ : S → ∆(A) as ρ∗ (s) :=
|I| i∈I
1 i i
x (s ). We then deﬁne xob : Ωpub → RI as xiob (s, a) = 0 if ai = ρi∗ (s) and set xiob (s, a)
|I|
to be a large negative constant otherwise, and set x∗ := xt + xob .35 Since transitions are
action-independent, for each i and s ∈ S, the expectation of the sum
i −i
i
i −i
i −i
i −i
i
r i (si , (ãi , ρ−i
∗ (s̃ , s ))) + x∗ ((s̃ , s ), (ã , ρ∗ (m , s ))) + θρ∗ ,r+x∗ (t)

of current payoﬀs, transfers xi∗ and continuation relative values θρi ∗ ,r+x∗ has a strict maximum
for s̃i = si and ãi = ρi∗ (s).
Let a direction λ ∈ Λ be given, and subtract a constant to x∗ (·) in order that λ · x∗(·) < 0.
The long-run payoﬀ associated with (ρ∗ , x∗ ) is v∗ := Eµ,ρ∗ (s) [r(s, a) + x∗ (s, a)]. The triple
(v∗ , ρ∗ , x∗ ) is then feasible in P0 (λ′ ) for all λ′ close enough to λ, with strict truth-telling
incentives.
Let now (v, ρ, x) be a feasible triple in P0 (λ) such that λ · x(·) < 0 and λ · v > k0 (λ) − ε0 .
For ε > 0, we denote by (ρε , xε ) the pair obtained when letting the p.r.d. choose between
(ρ, x) and (ρ∗ , x∗ ) with probabilities 1 − ε and ε respectively. The long-run payoﬀ associated
to the pair (ρε , xε ) is vε := (1 − ε)v + εv∗ .
35

Plainly, this is meaningful provided we view the p.r.d. as picking a pure action proﬁle according to ρ∗ (s).
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Observe that, since transitions are action-independent, one has θρε ,r+xε (s̄, s) = (1 −
ε)θρ,r+x (s̄, s) + εθρ∗ ,r+x∗ (s) for all (s̄, s). Using once again the assumption that transitions
are action-independent, this is easily seen to imply that the triple (vε , ρε , xε ) is feasible in
P0 (λ̃) for all λ̃ close to λ, with strict truth-telling incentives.
In addition λ · vε > k0 (λ) − ε0 > supz∈Zη λ · z + ε0 for ε small enough. The result follows,
since Λ is compact and the left-most and right-most expressions are continuous in λ.
We let κ be a common bound on v, x, and θρ,r+x for (v, ρ, x) ∈ S, and on z ∈ Z and r.
We pick an arbitrary ε1 ∈ (0, ε0), and set ε := ε1 /4κ. We let then ζ̄ be obtained via Lemma
2 given ε.
We assume that δ̄ < 1 is high enough so that the conditions (i–iv) are met for all δ ≥ δ̄:
√
1−δ
1−δ
1
< 1, (iii) ζ := 4κ
< ζ̄ and (iv) 6κξ < ε0 − ε1 .
(i) ξ := 1 − δ < , (ii)
3
δξ
δξ
A.1.2

Strategies

For simplicity, we assume that the initial state s1 , together with a ﬁctitious state s0 for round
0, is drawn according to µ. Let z ∈ Z be the desired equilibrium payoﬀ. The play is divided
into a sequence of phases. The durations of the successive phases form a sequence of i.i.d.
random variables. The initial round τ(k) of phase k, k ≥ 1, is set as follows: τ(1) = 0; in each
round n, the p.r.d. decides with probability ξ whether to start a new phase.36
In round τ(k+1) , a target payoﬀ z(k+1) ∈ RI , a direction λ(k+1) ∈ Λ, and a triple
(v(k+1) , ρ(k+1) , x(k+1) ) ∈ S are updated based on past public play, together with an auxiliary target w(k+1) ∈ RI .
We ﬁrst update w(k+1) according to
1−δ
1−δ
1
v(k) +
x(k) (mτ(k+1) −2 , ωpub,τ(k+1) −1 ).
ξw(k+1) + (1 − ξ)z(k) = z(k) −
δ
δ
δ

(4)

Next, we apply Lemma 2 with z = w(k+1) to get λ(k+1) and we next apply Lemma 3 with
λ(k+1) to get (v(k+1) , ρ(k+1) , x(k+1) ) ∈ S. Finally, we update z(k+1) to



1−δ
z(k+1) := w(k+1) + (1 − δ)
1+
θ(k) (mτ(k+1) −1 , mτ(k+1) ) − θ(k+1) (mτ(k+1) −1 , mτ(k+1) ) ,
δξ
(5)
where θ(k) is a short-hand notation for θρ(k) ,r+x(k) .
36

Thus, the duration ∆k := τ(k+1) − τ(k) of phase k is such that ∆k − 1 follows a geometric distribution
with parameter 1 − ξ.
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Updating thus takes place after the outcome of the p.r.d. is observed in round τ(k+1) . The
left-hand side in (4) accounts for the random duration of the phases. The auxiliary variable
w(k+1) and the extra term in (5) (when compared to FLM) serve to adjust continuation
relative values along the play, as will be apparent.
The construction is initialized with w(1) = z, which is used to deﬁne λ(1) , and (v(1) , ρ(1) , x(1) )
and z(1) using (5) (with θ(0) := 0). That this recursive construction is well-deﬁned follows
from Lemma 4 below.
Lemma 4 For all k (and all public histories), one has w(k) ∈ Zη .
Proof. Observe that kw(k) − z(k) k ≤ 3κ(1 − δ) by (5) and kw(k+1) − z(k) k ≤ 3κ

1−δ
by
δξ

(4) whenever w(k) and z(k) are deﬁned, so that



1
kw(k+1) − w(k) k ≤ 3κ(1 − δ) 1 +
≤ ζ.
δξ
Observe also that
w(k+1) − w(k) = w(k+1) − z(k) + z(k) − w(k)
(6)
n
o
1−δ
z(k) − v(k) + x(k) (mτ(k+1) −2 , ωpub,τ(k+1) −1 ) + z(k) − w(k)
(7)
=
δξ

 

1−δ 
1−δ
=
w(k) − v(k) + x(k) (mτ(k+1) −2 , ωpub,τ(k+1) −1 ) + 1 +
z(k) − w(k)
(8)
δξ
δξ

so that

1−δ
ε0 + 6κ(1 − δ)
δξ
1−δ
1−δ
≤ −
ε1 +
(ε1 − ε0 + 6κδξ)
δξ
δξ
≤ −εζ.

λ(k) · (w(k+1) − w(k) ) ≤ −

Hence w(k+1) ∈ Zη as soon as w(k) ∈ Zη .
Given a round n ∈ [τ(k) ; τ(k+1) − 1] in phase k, we let zn := z(k) stand for the target payoﬀ
in round n, and set (vn , ρn , xn , θn ) := (v(k) , ρ(k) , x(k) , θ(k) ). Note that zn is measurable w.r.t.
the public history available in round n, including the outcome of the p.r.d.
Under σ, each player i reports truthfully min = sin at the report step. At the action
step, player i plays ρin (mn ) if he reported truthfully min = sin . In the (oﬀ-path) event
min 6= sin , player i plays a best-reply to ρ−i (mn ) in the complete information game with
−i
payoﬀ r(sn , a) + xn (mn−1 , (mn , a)) + Ep(·|sin,m−i
θ (mn , sn+1 ) (where s−i
n = mn ).
n ) n
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A.1.3

Equilibrium Properties

Given a round n, we denote by γn the expected continuation payoﬀ under σ, conditional on
the public history at round n (up to and including the outcome of the p.r.d.).37
Lemma 5 One has γn = zn + (1 − δ)θn .
Proof. Given a public history hpub,n (including the outcome of the p.r.d. in round n),
γn satisﬁes the recursive equation
γn (hpub,n ) = (1 − δ)r(sn , ρn (sn )) + δE [γn+1 | hpub,n ] ,
where the expectation is computed over sn+1 ∼ p(· | sn ) and over the outcome of the p.r.d.
in round n + 1.
We prove that the sequence (zn + (1 − δ)θn )n obeys the same recursion, that is,
zn + (1 − δ)θn = (1 − δ)r(sn , ρn (sn )) + δE [zn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1 | hpub,n ] .

(9)

The claim will follow (since both sequences are bounded, a contraction argument applies).
Let h̄pub,n+1 = (hpub,n , an , sn+1) be an arbitrary public extension of hpub,n up to round
n + 1, ending prior to the outcome of the p.r.d. in round n + 1. At h̄pub,n+1 , the p.r.d.
chooses with probability ξ whether zn+1 is equal to z(k+1) or to z(k) . (Abusing notations),


the expectation E zn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1 | h̄pub,n+1 over the outcome of the p.r.d. is therefore


(1 − ξ) z(k) + (1 − δ)θ(k) (sn , sn+1 ) + ξ z(k+1) + (1 − δ)θ(k+1) (sn , sn+1 )
(10)





1−δ
θ(k) (sn , sn+1 )
= (1 − ξ) z(k) + (1 − δ)θ(k) (sn , sn+1 ) + ξ w(k+1) + (1 − δ) 1 +
δξ


1
1−δ
1−δ
1−δ
θ(k) (sn , sn+1 ) +
z(k) −
v(k) +
x(k) (sn−1 , ωpub,n ) ,
=
δ
δ
δ
δ
while the ﬁrst equality holds by virtue of (5) and the second one by (4).
Taking expectations over h̄pub,n+1 conditional on hpub,n , the RHS in (9) is
(1 − δ)r(sn , ρn (sn )) + δE [zn+1 + (1 − δ)θn+1 | hpub,n ]
(11)



= z(k) + (1 − δ) Eρn (sn ),p(·|sn) r(sn , an ) + x(k) (sn−1 , ωpub,n ) + θ(k) (sn , sn+1 ) − v(k)
= z(k) + (1 − δ)θ(k) (sn−1 , sn ) = zn + (1 − δ)θn ,

as desired – where the last equality uses the ACOE.
37

That is, denote by Hpub,n the (round n, public information) algebra on plays, by Pσ the probability
distribution
by σ, and by Eσ the expectation operator under Pσ . Then γn := (1 −
" +∞ over plays induced
#
X
δ)Eσ
δ u rn+u | Hpub,n –in particular, γn is computed under the “assumption” that mn = sn .
u=0
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Corollary 7 σ is a truthful PBE with expected payoff z.
Proof. We check that player i has no proﬁtable one-round deviation. Let be given a
private history hin of player i up to round n, including the realization of sin , and denote by
hpub,n the public part of hin . We compute the expected continuation payoﬀ of player i when
ﬁrst reporting min , next choosing an action contingent on reports according to some map
β i : S → Ai , and ﬁnally switching back to σ i .
−i
Fix the realizations s−i
n = mn of the other players’ types, and proceed as in the proof
of the previous claim. The equalities in (10) are algebraic identities, and still hold when
substituting min to sin . The equality (11) also remains valid, with the appropriate changes.
Speciﬁcally, the expected continuation payoﬀ of player i is given by
o
n

i i
i
i
i
i
r (sn , an ) + xn (mn−1 , ωpub,n ) + Ep(·|sn) θn (mn , sn+1 ) .
zn − vn + (1 − δ) E(β i (mn ),ρ−i
n (mn ))
(12)
−i
We thus need to check that the expectation (over sn ) in (12) is maximized when reporting
truthfully.38 Conditional on the p.r.d. choosing not to switch to a new block in round n,
the expected continuation payoﬀ of player i given hin , is equal (up to the constant term
zni − vni ) to the interim expected payoﬀ of i in the game Γ(ρn , xn ) when reporting min and
i
playing β i (given (min−1 , s−i
n−1 ) and sn , and multiplied by 1 − δ). From the strict optimality
of truth-telling in the game Γ(ρn , xn ), it follows that any incorrect report min 6= sin leads to
a loss of the order of 1 − δ (compared to truth-telling).
Conditional on the p.r.d. choosing to switch to a new block, lying may improve the
expectation of (12) by an amount of the order of at most 1 − δ. Since the probability of
switching is only ξ, truth-telling is optimal (for δ close to 1).

A.2

Proof of Proposition 2

We here prove Proposition 2. In this section, and in later sections as well, we ﬁnd it convenient to use the notion of a truthful pair. Given here ρ : S → ×i∈I ∆(Ai ) and x : Ωpub → RI ,
the pair (ρ, x) is truthful if it is optimal for each i ∈ I to report truthfully in Γ(ρ, x), assuming players −i do so, and ρ is played at the action step. The pair (ρ, x) is (strictly) ex post
truthful if it is (strictly) ex post optimal to report truthfully in Γ(ρ, x). That is, for each i
Following a truthful report min = sin , the optimality of ρn in Γ(ρn , xn ) ensures that obedience is optimal
in round n.
38
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and s ∈ S, the expectation (over t) of
i
r i (si , ρ(s̃i , s−i )) + xi ((s̃i , s−i ), ρ(s̃i , s−i )) + θρ,r+x
(t)

has a (strict) maximum for s̃i = si .
Let ﬁrst the direction λ be equal to −ei , for some i ∈ I. Let ā−i ∈ A−i and ρ̄i : S i → Ai
achieve the min max in the deﬁnition of v i , and deﬁne ρ̄−i : S i → A−i as ρ̄−i (si ) = ā−i . Let
xρ̄ : A → RI be transfers such that (i) xiρ̄ (·) = 0 and, for j 6= i, (ii) xjρ̄ (a) = 0 if a−i = ā−i and
xjρ̄ (a) is a large negative number otherwise. Then (v i , ρ̄, xρ̄ ) is feasible in P0 (−ei ). Therefore
k0 (−ei ) ≥ −v i , as desired.
We now ﬁx λ ∈ Λ, with λ 6= −ei , and prove that k0 (λ) ≥ k̄(λ). Recall that I+ := I+ (λ) =
{i ∈ I, λi > 0}, and consider the MDP with state space S+ := ×i∈I+ S i and stage reward
X
X
λi r i (µi , a).
λi r i (si , a) +
rλ (s+ , a) :=
i∈I+

i∈I
/ +

The (long-run) value of this MDP is equal to k̄(λ) and we let θλ : S+ → R denote the
associated relative value so that
k̄(λ) + θλ (s+ ) = max {rλ (s+ , a)} + Ep(·|s+) θλ (t+ ) for all s+ ∈ S+ .
a∈A

(13)

Pure optimal policies ρ : S+ → A are characterized by the property that ρ(s+ ) achieves
the maximum in (13) for each s+ ∈ S+ .
We let ρλ : S+ → A be an arbitrary optimal policy. We construct transfers x : S ×Ωpub →
I
R such that (k̄(λ), ρλ , x) is feasible in P0 (λ), thereby showing k0 (λ) ≥ k̄(λ).39
The transfers x are obtained as the sum of transfers xt : S × S → RI , which are contingent on successive reports and provide truth-telling incentives, and of transfers inducing
obedience. The transfers xt are deﬁned in two steps. We ﬁrst deﬁne transfers x1 of the VCG
type, contingent on current reports, and rely next on AS to balance the transfers.
Claim 8 There exists x1 : S → RI such that (ρλ , x1 ) is (ex post) truthful.
Proof. For i ∈
/ I+ , it suﬃces to set xi1 = 0 as the reports by i are ignored. Fix now
i ∈ I+ (λ). For s ∈ S, deﬁne xi1 (s) by the equation
λi xi1 (s) := rλ (s+ , ρλ (s+ )) − λi r i (si , ρλ (s+ )).
39

In this section, we only deal with the policy ρλ , and will drop the reference to ρλ when writing relative
values.
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i
i
Observe that λi θr+x
: S+ → R satisﬁes (13) as well. Hence, λi θr+x
= θλ up to an additive
1
1
constant.
Since ρλ (s+ ) achieves the maximum in (13), it follows that (ρλ , x1 ) is truthful.

Note that x1 = 0 if λ = ei for some i, so that λ · x1 (·) = 0. We set xt = x1 in that case.
From now on, we assume that λ is not a coordinate vector and adapt arguments from AS.
For i ∈ I, deﬁne ﬁrst xi2 : S × S i → R by xi2 (s̄, si ) := Es−i∼p(·|s̄−i) [xi1 (s)]. Plainly, (ρλ , x2 )
is truthful as well. The relative values θxi 2 : S × S i → R solve
γ + θxi 2 (s̄, si ) = xi2 (s̄, si ) + Es−i∼p(·|s̄−i),ti ∼p(·|si) θxi 2 (s, ti )

(14)

where γ = E(s̄,si)∼µ [xi2 (s̄, si )].
Deﬁne next xi3 : S × S i → R as
xi3 (s̄, si ) := θxi 2 (s̄, si ) − Es̃i∼p(·|s̄i) θxi 2 (s̄, s̃i ).
Claim 9 The pair (ρλ , x3 ) is truthful.
Proof. One has Esi ∼p(·|s̄i) [xi3 (s̄, si )] = 0 for each s̄, hence the equality


xi3 (s̄, si ) = xi3 (s̄, si ) + Es−i∼p(·|s̄−i),ti ∼p(·|si) xi3 (s, ti )

holds. That is, xi3 = θxi 3 .
Fix s̄ ∈ S, si ∈ S i and mi ∈ S i . For given s−i ∈ S −i , ti ∈ S i , and setting m := (s−i , mi ),
the expression
i
r i (si , ρλ (m)) + xi3 (s̄, mi ) + θr+x
(m, ti )
(15)
3
is equal to
r i (si , ρλ (m)) + θxi 2 (s̄, mi ) + θri (m, ti ) + θxi 3 (m, ti )
(up to the additive term Es̃i ∼p(·|s̄i) θx2 (s̄, s̃i ) which is independent of mi ). Thanks to the
equality x3 = θx3 , the former expression is in turn equal to


r i (si , ρλ (m)) + θxi 2 (s̄, mi ) + θri (m, ti ) + θxi 2 (m, ti ) − Et̃i ∼p(·|mi ) θxi 2 (m, t̃i ) .

(16)

In view of (14), the expectation of (16) (and therefore of (15)) when s−i ∼ p(· | s̄−i ) and
ti ∼ p(· | si ), is equal to the expectation of
i
r i (si , ρλ (m)) + xi2 (s̄, mi ) + θr+x
(m, ti ).
2

Since (ρλ , x2 ) is truthful, so is (ρλ , x3 ).
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Claim 10 Let µij ∈ R be arbitrary. For i ∈ I, set
X
xi4 (s̄, s) := xi3 (s̄, si ) +
µij xj3 (s̄, sj ).
j6=i

Then (ρλ , x4 ) is truthful.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I, s̄ ∈ S, si ∈ S i . For given s−i = m−i and t ∈ S, the sum
i
r i (si , ρλ (m)) + xi4 (s̄, m) + θr+x
(m, t)
4

(17)

is equal, thanks to θxj 3 = xj3 , to
i
(m, t) +
r i (si , ρλ (m)) + xi3 (s̄, mi ) + θr+x
3

X
j6=i


µij xj3 (s̄, mj ) + xj3 (m, tj ) .



In this latter expression, and for ﬁxed j 6= i, xj3 (s̄, mj ) is independent of mi and Etj ∼p(·|sj ) xj3 (m, tj ) =
0. Since (ρλ , x3 ) is truthful, so is (ρλ , x4 ).
X
Since λ is not a coordinate vector, the system λi +
λj µji = 0 (i ∈ I) has a solution
j6=i

(µij ). With this choice, λ · x4 (·) = 0 and we set xt (·) := x4 (·).
We ﬁnally add transfers inducing obedience. Since λ is not a coordinate direction, there
exists xρλ : S × A → RI such that (i) λ · xρλ (·) = 0, (ii) xρλ (s, ρλ (s)) = 0 for each s ∈ S and
i
i
(iii) xi (s, ai , ρ−i
λ (s)) is a large negative constant for each s ∈ S, i ∈ I, and a 6= ρλ (s).
The triple (k̄(λ), ρλ , xt + xρλ ) is feasible in P0 (λ).

To conclude, we provide a short proof of the reverse inequality k0 (λ) ≤ k̄(λ) for all
λ ∈ Λ (which is not needed for deriving Corollary 3). The proof uses the same idea as the
proof of Proposition 1. Let (v, ρ, x) be feasible in P0 (λ). We modify ρ and x by letting
the p.r.d. pick a ﬁctitious report s̃j ∼ µj for all j ∈
/ I+ and let actions and transfers be
determined by ρ and x, using these ﬁctitious reports and the actual reports of players i ∈ I+ .
Denote by ρ̃ : S+ → ×i∈I ∆(Ai ) the modiﬁed policy and by x̃ the modiﬁed transfers. Since
(v, ρ, x) is feasible and thanks to the private values assumption, all players j ∈
/ I+ are weakly
worse oﬀ in Γ(ρ̃, x̃) while players i ∈ I+ are unaﬀected. Since λ · x̃(·) ≤ 0, this implies
λ · v ≤ Eµ,ρ̃ [λ · r(s, a)] ≤ k̄(λ).
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B
B.1

Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 3

We here prove Proposition 3. Fix a direction λ ∈ Λ and a discount factor δ < 1. We set
I+ := I+ (λ), I− = I \ I+ , and ∆− := ×i∈I− ∆(S i ). We introduce the MDP Mλ in which
players jointly maximize the λ-weighted sum of discounted payoﬀs, and ignore the states of
players i ∈ I− . Formally, the state space of Mλ is S+ × ∆− with elements denoted (s+ , π− ),
and the action set is A. The transitions given (s+ , π− ) and conditional on y, are deduced
from p. With obvious notations, the stage reward is
X
X
λi r i (π i , a).
λi r i (si , a) +
rλ ((s+ , π− ), a) :=
i∈I−

i∈I+

We denote by vδ (s+ , π− ) the value of the δ-discounted version of Mλ , starting from (s+ , π− ).
Following the same argument as in Proposition 1, for every initial distribution π =
(π+ , π− ) ∈ ×i∈I ∆(S i ) and every Nash equilibrium of the game with payoﬀ vector v ∈ RI ,
one has λ · v ≤ λ · Es+ ∼π+ [vδ (s+ , π− )]. Hence the result will follow from the equality
lim vδ (s+ , π− ) = k̄1 (λ), for all (s+ , π− ).

δ→1

(18)

We will prove (18) by approximating Mλ with MDPs with a ﬁnite state space and using
results from the theory of such MDPs. We introduce some piece of notation, to be used later
as well. Given a ﬁnite subset K i of ∆(S i ), a map φi : K i × Y → K i and η > 0, the pair
(K i , φi ) is an η-approximation of ∆(S i ) if
kφi (k i , y) − pi (· | k i , y)k∞ < η,

(19)

for every k i ∈ K i and y ∈ Y . Intuitively, (19) entails that the exact posterior on the next
state given a prior k i on the current state si and a signal y, is η-close to φi (k i , y). That is,
the map φi is a good approximation of the evolution of beliefs over states.40
Given a family (K i , φi ) of η-approximations of ∆(S i ), i ∈ I− , the pair (K, φ) deﬁned as
K = ×i∈I− K i and φ(k, y) = (φi (k i , y))i is said to be an η-approximation of ∆− .
We will without further notice assume that all η-approximations below satisfy the following communication property: for any two k, k̃ ∈ K, there exists an integer N ∈ N, action
proﬁles a1 , . . . , aN , and signals y1 , . . . , yN , such that (i) p(yn | an ) > 0 for each n, and (ii)
Note though that this interpretation is valid only if y is uninformative about si . Note also that we do
not require that K i be a “large” subset of ∆(S i ).
40
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the sequence (kn ) deﬁned by k1 = k and kn+1 = φ(kn , yn ) is such that kN +1 = k̃.41 Given an
η-approximation (K, φ) of ∆− , we deﬁne Mφ to be the MDP with ﬁnite state space S+ × K,
action set A, and transitions deduced from p(· | a) ∈ ∆(Y ) and φ. Finally, the stage reward
function is (the restriction of) rλ . Thus, Mφ diﬀers from Mλ only through the transition
function, and we think of Mφ as a ﬁnite state approximation of Mλ . The MDP Mφ is
communicating.42
Let ε > 0 be arbitrary and let r̄ be an upper bound on krk. Since the transition
function p(· | s, a) is aperiodic and irreducible, there exists a constant c ∈ (0, 1) such
X
that for each (as )s∈S , and any two distributions π and π̃ in ×i∈I ∆(S i ), one has k
p(· |
s∈S

s, as ) (πs − π̃s ) k∞ ≤ ckπ − π̃k∞ . Pick η < ε(1 − c)/r̄, and an η-approximation (K, φ) of ∆− .
In both MDPs Mλ and Mφ , strategies map past public signals (yn ) and past (and
current) states (s+,n ) of players in I+ into an action proﬁle. We prove in Lemma 6 below
that any strategy induces approximately the same payoﬀ in Mλ and in Mφ . Given a strategy
σ, we denote by γδ (·, σ) and γδ,φ (·, σ) the payoﬀ induced in Mλ and Mφ respectively, as a
function of the initial state.
Lemma 6 For every discount factor δ < 1, any s+ ∈ S+ , π− ∈ ∆− and k ∈ K, one has
|γδ ((s+ , π− ), σ) − γδ,φ ((s+ , k), σ)| ≤ ε +

r̄(1 − δ)
.
1 − δc

Proof. Fix σ and an arbitrary play h∞ = (s+,n , yn , an )n . Given a player i ∈ I− and a
round n ∈ N, let πni ∈ ∆(S i ) and kni be the i-th component of the state in Mλ and Mφ
along h∞ .43 Along h∞ , the payoﬀ diﬀerence in Mλ and Mφ is
(1 − δ)

∞
X
n=1

(rλ (s+,n , π−,n , an ) − rλ (s+,n , kn , an )) ≤ r̄(1 − δ)

∞
X
n=1

δ n−1 kπ−,n − kn k∞ .

i
i
The two sequences obey the recursions πni = pi (· | πn−1
, yn−1 ) and kni = φi (kn−1
, yn−1)
i
i
so that, by the triangle inequality, one has kπni − kni k∞ ≤ ckπn−1
− kn−1
k∞ + η. Routine
η
n−1
i
i
computations then lead to kπn − kn k∞ ≤
+ c , hence the payoﬀ diﬀerence along h∞
1−c
r̄(1 − δ)
r̄η
+
.
does not exceed
1−c
1 − δc
41

The existence of communicating η-approximations is easy to establish. Not all η-approximations are
communicating.
42
Using the full-support assumption and the communicating property of (K, φ).
43
That is, πni is the conditional distribution of sin given past signals, while kni is obtained by repeated
applications of φi .
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Let vδ,φ be the value of the δ-discounted version of Mφ . Since Mφ has a ﬁnite state
state, by Blackwell (1962), there is a (pure) policy ρ∗ : S+ × K → A that is optimal for all
δ close enough to one. That is, γδ,φ (ρ∗ ) = vδ,φ for δ large enough, hence vφ := limδ→1 vδ,φ
exists. Since Mφ is communicating, the limit value vφ is independent of the initial state.
Claim 11 For all (s+ , π− ), one has | limδ→1 vδ (s+ , π− ) − vφ | ≤ ε.
Proof. By Lemma 6, one has both
| lim sup vδ − vφ | ≤ ε and | lim inf vδ − vφ | ≤ ε.
δ→1

δ→1

Since ε is arbitrary, this implies the convergence of vδ as δ → 1, with | limδ vδ − vφ | ≤ ε.
Claim 12 vφ ≤ k̄1 (λ) + ε.
Proof. Plainly, the policy ρ∗ may also be either viewed as a strategy in Mλ , or as a policy
in the initial game with state space S, independent of the states of players i ∈ I− . Under
both “interpretations,” the payoﬀ induced by ρ∗ is of course equal to γδ (·, ρ∗ ). According to
the ﬁrst interpretation, Lemma 6 applies for each δ, and lim sup kγδ (·, ρ∗ ) − γδ,φ (·, ρ∗ )k∞ ≤
δ→1

ε. According to the second interpretation, ρ∗ induces a Markov chain over S × K. Let
E = S × KE be an arbitrary ergodic set44 for this Markov chain, with invariant measure
µE ∈ ∆(S × KE × A). Given an initial state (s̄, k̄) ∈ E, one has limδ→1 γδ,φ ((s̄, k̄), ρ∗ ) = vφ
(by the choice of ρ∗ ), while limδ→1 γδ ((s̄, k̄), ρ∗ ) = EµE [λ · r(s, a)]. Combining these results,
one gets
vφ ≤ EµE [λ · r(s, a)] + ε.
(20)
To conclude, deﬁne φE : KE × Y → KE by φE (k, y) = φ(k, y) whenever φ(k, y) ∈ KE ,
and let φE (k, y) ∈ KE be arbitrary otherwise. The extended policy (ρ, KE , φE ) is irreducible,
with invariant measure µE . Hence EµE [λ · r(s, a)] ≤ k̄1 (λ).
Combining the last two claims, limδ→1 vδ (s+ , π− ) ≤ k̄1 (λ) + 2ε. Since ε > 0 is arbitrary,
it follows that limδ→1 vδ (s+ , π− ) ≤ k̄1 (λ).
The reverse inequality k̄1 (λ) ≤ limδ→1 vδ is straightforward. Indeed, let ρext = (ρ, K, φ)
be an arbitrary irreducible extended policy, where ρ : S × K → ∆(A) is independent of
(sj )j ∈I
/ + . The policy ρ induces a strategy in Mλ , hence γδ (·, ρ) ≤ vδ (·). Letting δ → 1, one
obtains Eµρext [λ · r(s, a)] ≤ limδ→1 vδ .
44

That all ergodic sets are product sets follows from the full support assumption.
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B.2
B.2.1

Proof of Proposition 4 and Theorem 4
An overview

To unify notations, we set k̃1 (−ei ) = −v i for i ∈ I, and k̃1 (λ) = k̄1 (λ) otherwise, so that
V1∗∗ = {z ∈ RI , λ · z ≤ k̃1 (λ) for all λ}. We observe that k̄1 (·) is lower semi-continuous, and
that k̄1 (−ei ) ≥ −v i . Thus, k̃1 (·) is lower semi-continuous as well.
We will prove the following strengthening of Proposition 4.
Lemma 7 For every λ ∈ Λ and ε > 0, there exists a triple (v, ρext , x), which is feasible in
P1 (λ), with strict truth-telling incentives, and such that λ · v > k̃1 (λ) − ε.
Lemma 7 readily implies k1 (λ) ≥ k̃1 (λ). The following subsections are devoted to the
proof of Lemma 7.
In the meantime, we deduce Theorem 4 from Lemma 7. We let Z be a compact set
included in the interior of V1∗∗ . Since Z is compact, there exists η > 0 such that the ηneighborhood Zη of Z is also included in the interior of V1∗∗ . Thus, for all λ ∈ Λ, there is
ε > 0 such that maxz∈Zη λ · z + ε < k̃1 (λ). Hence, by compactness of Λ and since k̃1 is lower
semi-continuous, there is ε0 > 0 such that
∀λ ∈ Λ, max λ · z + 2ε0 < k̃1 (λ).
Zη

(21)

Lemma 8 There exists a finite set S of triples (v, ρext , x) such that the following holds. For
every direction λ ∈ Λ, there is an element (v, ρext , x) of S such that
1. (v, ρext , x) is feasible in P1 (λ) with strict truth-telling incentives.
2. maxz∈Zη λ · z + ε0 < λ · v.
Proof. Given λ ∈ Λ, apply Lemma 7 with ε = ε0 . Plainly, by adding a small constant
to x, we may assume that in addition λ · x(·) < 0 for ﬁxed λ, hence (v, ρext , x) is feasible in
P1 (λ′ ) for all λ′ close enough to λ. By (21), the inequality λ · v > k̃1 (λ) − ε0 implies
λ · v > sup λ · z + ε0 .
z∈Zη

Since both sides of the inequality are continuous in λ and since Λ is compact, Lemma 8, and
therefore Theorem 4, follows from Lemma 7.
Lemma 8 is the exact analog of Lemma 3 (in the proof of Theorem 2). Inspection of
the proof of Theorem 2 then shows that Lemma 2 is still valid here and that all subsequent
50

arguments based on Lemmas 2 and 3 remain valid (that is, both the construction of strategies
in Section 3 and the results from Section A.1.3 readily extend to the present, more general
setup).45 Thus, Theorem 4 follows.
B.2.2

Step 1: There is a strictly truthful pair (ρext,0 , x0 )

We start to prove Lemma 8. In this ﬁrst step, we construct a speciﬁc ex post, strictly truthful
(pure) pair (ρext,0 , x0 ). It will later be used as a perturbation, and will thus play a role analog
to that of the pair (ρ∗ , x∗ ) in Section 3.
By A1 and as in Section 3, there exists for each i ∈ I a family µi (si ) ∈ ∆(A) of
distributions, and transfers τ i : S i → R such that, for each si , the map s̃i 7→ τ i (s̃i ) +


Ea∼µ(s̃i ) θ~ai ,r (si ) has a strict maximum at s̃i = si . We assume w.l.o.g. that µi (si ) has full
support.
1 i i
1 X i i
µ (s ) and T i (s) :=
τ (s ) so that, for each i ∈ I
For s ∈ S, deﬁne then µ(s) :=
|I| i∈I
|I|
and s ∈ S, the map


s̃i 7→ T i (s̃i , s−i ) + Ea∼µ(s̃i ,s−i) θ~ai ,r (si )

has a strict maximum at s̃i = si .

Let η0 > 0 to be ﬁxed later, and set K0 = A. Under the extended policy ρext,0 =
(ρ0 , K0 , φ0 ), players repeat the same action proﬁle a ∈ K0 until the p.r.d. picks at a random
time a (possibly) diﬀerent new action proﬁle according to a distribution which is contingent
on the states reported in that round.
Formally, given the recommendation a0 in the previous round, and reports m in the
current round, the p.r.d. picks a recommended action proﬁle a′0 ∈ A, which is equal to a0
with probability 1 − η0 , and drawn according to µ(m) otherwise. We set ρ0 (m, a0 ) = a′0 ,
φ0 (m, a0 , y) = a′0 , and x0 (m, a0 ) = −γa~′ + η0 T (m).46,47
0
Thus, (ρ0 , K0 , φ0 ) is irreducible. Denote by µη0 the invariant measure and by γη0 ∈ RI and
θη0 : S × K0 → RI the long-run payoﬀ and relative values respectively (including transfers).
45

The only, quite minor modiﬁcation is as follows. Elements of S are now triples (ρext , x, v), where
ρext = (ρ, K, φ) is an extended policy, and the auxiliary set K changes with ρ. At the beginning of the k-th
block, once the extended policy (ρ(k) , K(k) , φ(k) ) has been selected as a function of past public play, an initial
state in K(k) still needs to be speciﬁed. This choice is irrelevant for the proofs.
46
Consistent with our usage, the dependence of ρ0 , x0 and φ0 on the outcome of the p.r.d. does not appear
explicitly.
47
Recall that γ~a is the long-run payoﬀ induced by the constant policy ~a. That is, γ~a = Es∼µ~a [r(s, a)] =
r(µ~a , a).
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Lemma 9 Both limη0 →0 µη0 and limη0 →0 θη0 exist. In addition, limη0 →0 θη0 (s, k0 ) − θk~0 ,r (s)
only depends on k0 .
Proof. The distribution µη0 is the unique solution to a linear system with coeﬃcients
aﬃne in η0 . Therefore, η0 7→ µη0 is a rational function and, being bounded, has a limit as
η0 → 0. We refer to the online appendix for the proof relative to θη0 . The proof uses similar
arguments, but the proof that η0 7→ θη0 is bounded is more delicate.
Lemma 10 For η0 small enough, the pair (ρext,0 , x0 ) is ex post strictly truthful.
Proof. We must show that in the one-shot Bayesian game Γ(ρext,0 , x0 ) and given a state
proﬁle (s, a) ∈ S ×K0 , each player i ﬁnds it strictly optimal to report si (assuming obedience
to ρext,0 ). Fix (s, a) ∈ S × K0 . The actual payoﬀ of player i when reporting s̃i ∈ S i is
r i (si , a′ ) + xi0 ((s̃i , s−i ), a′ ) + θηi 0 (t, a′ ),
where a′ ∈ A is the recommendation of the p.r.d. and t ∼ p(· | s, a′ ).
Taking expectations over a′ and t, and since x0 (s̃i , s−i , a′ ) = η0 T (s̃i , s−i ) − γa~′ , the expected payoﬀ when reporting s̃i is



(1 − η0 ) r i (si , a) − γ~a + Et∼p(·|s,a) θηi 0 (t, a)



+ η0 Ea′ ∼µ(s̃i ,s−i) r i (si , a′ ) + T i (s̃i , s−i ) − γa~′ + Et∼p(·|s,a′ ) θηi 0 (t, a′ ) .

The ﬁrst term is independent of s̃i . As for the second, observe that, for ﬁxed a′ , the term
between brackets converges as η0 → 0 to
r i (si , a′ ) + T i (s̃i , s−i ) − γa~′ + Et∼p(·|s,a′) θai~′ ,r (ti ),
(up to an additive constant), which is equal to T i (s̃i , s−i ) + θai~′ ,r (si ). By the choice of µ and
T , the expectation of the latter term under a′ ∼ µ(s̃i , s−i ) has a strict maximum for s̃i = si .
Therefore, it is ex post strictly optimal for player i to report truthfully.

B.2.3

Step 2: λ is not a coordinate direction

We here deal with the more diﬃcult case where λ is not a coordinate direction. We rely on
Proposition 5 below deals with the following setup. Let be given an irreducible MDP with
state space Ω, action set B, transition function q(· | ω, b), reward r : Ω × B → R (all sets
being ﬁnite). Assume that successive states are observed by a ﬁrst agent, who makes a report
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to a second one, who in turn chooses an action, the reward of both agents being r. Plainly,
if the second agent follows a stationary optimal policy, it is weakly optimal for the ﬁrst
one to be truthful. According to Proposition 5, there are arbitrarily small report-contingent
transfers and an optimal policy in the perturbed MDP, see P1, such that truth-telling is
strictly optimal whenever the report aﬀects the action (distribution) being played, see P2.
Proposition 5 For each ε > 0, there exists x : Ω × B → R and ρ : Ω → int∆(B) such that
the following holds, with θ := θρ,r+x :
P1 kx(·)k < ε and ρ is an optimal policy in the MDP with reward r + x.
P2 For every ω, ω̃ ∈ Ω,
r(ω, ρ(ω)) + x(ω, ρ(ω)) + Eq(·|ω,ρ(ω)) θ(ω ′ ) ≥ r(ω, ρ(ω̃)) + x(ω̃, ρ(ω̃)) + Eq(·|ω,ρ(ω̃)) θ(ω ′ ),
and a strict inequality holds whenever ρ(ω̃) 6= ρ(ω).
Proposition 5 is immediate when transitions are action-independent. In that case indeed,
and for ω ∈ Ω, set B(ω) := argmaxB r(ω, ·), let ρ(ω) be the uniform distribution over B(ω)
and set x(ω) := η|B(ω)|. For small η > 0, the pair (ρ, x) satisﬁes P1 and P2. The proof is
signiﬁcantly more involved under action-dependent transitions. It is in the online appendix.
We now proceed in three (sub-)steps. We ﬁrst rely on Proposition 5 to prove in Lemma
11 the existence of an extended policy ρext,1 and of transfers x1 such that the long-run payoﬀ
under ρext,1 is close to k̄1 (λ) and such that truth-telling incentives are ex post strict unless
reports do not aﬀect the action being played. By perturbing the latter extended policy with
the policy ρext,0 deﬁned in Step 1, we next prove in Lemma 12 the existence of an ex post
strictly truthful pair (ρext , x) such that the long-run payoﬀ under ρext –excluding transfers–
is close to k̄1 (λ). We conclude using AS and the action-identiﬁability assumption A2.
Lemma 11 For all ε > 0, there exists an irreducible extended policy ρext,1 = (ρ1 , K1 , φ1 )
where ρ1 : S+ × K1 → ∆(A) and transfers x1 : S+ × K1 → RI , s.t.
C1 Eµρext,1 [λ · r(s, a)] > k̄1 (λ) − ε;
C2 For all (s, k) ∈ S × K, all i ∈ I+ and s̃i 6= si such that ρ(s+ , k) 6= ρ(s̃i , s−i
+ , k), player i
i
i
ex post strictly prefers reporting s over s̃ in Γ(ρext,1 , x1 ) (given (s, k)).
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Proof. Proposition 5 holds for ﬁnite MDPs, hence we will have to rely on ﬁnite state
approximations of the MDP Mλ . We use the notations from Section B.1. Let ε > 0 be
given. We let (K1 , φ1 ) be an η-approximation of ∆− such that the limit value vφ of the MDP
ε
Mφ induced by (K1 , φ1 ) is close to k̄1 (λ): |vφ − k̄1 (λ)| < . In addition, we assume that
3
η > 0 is small enough48 so that, for each irreducible ρ : S+ × K1 → ∆(A), one has
ε
E(s+ ,k,a)∼µρ [rλ (s+ , k, a)] − E(s,a)∼µρ [λ · r(s, a)] < ,
3

(22)

where µρ ∈ ∆(S × K1 × A) is the invariant distribution induced by ρ. Inequality (22) reads
as follows: the two expectations are the long-run payoﬀs induced by ρ in the MDPs Mφ and
Mλ respectively. Consequently, the long-run λ-weighted payoﬀ induced by any such policy
ρ is close to the payoﬀ induced in Mφ .
With this choice of (K1 , φ1 ), we apply Proposition 5 to the MDP Mφ with ε/3, and get
ρ1 : S+ × K1 → int ∆(A) and x̄ : S+ × K1 × A → R. Abusing notations, we will also view
ρ1 and x̄ as maps deﬁned on S × K1 and S × K1 × A, independent of si for i ∈ I− .
To repeat, the pair (ρext,1 , x̄) is such that for all ω, ω̃ ∈ S+ × K1 , and denoting q the
transition function in Mφ , one has
rλ (ω, ρ1 (ω)) + x̄(ω, ρ1 (ω)) + Eq(·|ω,ρ1 (ω)) θρ1 ,rλ +x̄ (ω ′)
> rλ (ω, ρ1 (ω̃)) + x̄(ω̃, ρ1 (ω̃)) + Eq(·|ω,ρ1 (ω̃)) θρ1 ,rλ +x̄ (ω ′)
whenever ρ1 (ω) 6= ρ1 (ω̃) and
Eµρ1 [rλ (ω, ρ1(ω))] ≥ vφ −

ε
2ε
≥ k̄1 (λ) − .
3
3

Together with (22), this proves C1.
Next, we follow Claim 9 and introduce transfers of the VCG type. For i ∈ I+ , we deﬁne
xi1 : S+ × K1 → R by
λi r i (ω, ρ1 (ω)) + λi xi1 (ω) := rλ (ω, ρ1 (ω)) + x̄(ω, ρ1(ω))
so that, as in Claim 9, one has λi θρi 1 ,r+x1 = θρ1 ,rλ +x̄ . Therefore, ρ1 inherits the following
truth-telling property in the one-shot game Γ(ρext,1 , x1 ): at each state (s+ , k) ∈ S+ × K1 and
for each i ∈ I+ , player i strictly prefers reporting si over s̃i whenever ρ1 (s+ , k) 6= ρ1 (s̃i , s−i
+ , k).
i
i
i
For i ∈ I− , set x1 = 0. Since ρ1 is independent of s ∈ S , the latter property also holds
for all i ∈ I− . Thus, C2 holds.
48

It suﬃces to take η < (1 − c)ε/3r̄, see Section B.1.
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Lemma 12 For all ε > 0, there exists an irreducible extended policy ρext = (ρ, K, φ) such
that
C’1 λ · Eµρext [λ · r(s, a)] ≥ k̄1 (λ) − ε.
C’2 The pair (ρext , x) is ex post strictly truthful.
Proof. We construct (ρ, K, φ) as a perturbation of (ρ1 , K1 , φ1 ) using (ρ0 , K0 , φ0) so that
the play alternates between long phases in S × K1 and long but much shorter, phases in
S × K0 .
Let η1 > 0 be small, to be ﬁxed later. We deﬁne the extended policy ρext = (ρ, K, φ) as
follows. We set K = K0 ∪ K1 . In each round, given the current public auxiliary state k ∈ K
and reports s ∈ S, the p.r.d. updates the public state to k ′ ∈ K as follows. If k ∈ K1 , k ′
is set to k with probability 1 − η12 , and k ′ ∼ µ(s) otherwise. If k ∈ K0 , k ′ is set to a ﬁxed
k̄1 ∈ K1 with probability η12 , and otherwise determined as under ρext,0 (i.e., set to k with
probability 1 − η0 , and otherwise drawn according to µ(s)).
We then deﬁne ρ : S × K → ∆(A) as ρ(s, k) = ρ0 (s, k ′ ) if k ′ ∈ K0 and ρ(s, k) = ρ1 (s, k ′ )
if k ′ ∈ K1 . We also set φ(k, y) = φ1 (k ′ , y) if k ′ ∈ K1 and φ(k, y) = k ′ if k ′ ∈ K0 .49
Transfers x : S×K → RI are deﬁned as x(s, k) = x1 (s, k ′ ) if k ′ ∈ K1 , x(s, k) = x0 (s, k ′ ) =
η0 T (s) − γk~′ if both k, k ′ ∈ K0 and x(s, k) = T (s) − γk~′ if k ∈ K1 and k ′ ∈ K0 .
The irreducibility of (ρ, K, φ) follows from that of both (ρ0 , K0 , φ0 ) and (ρ1 , K1 , φ1 ). We
denote by µη1 := µρext the invariant measure as a function of η1 , and by θη1 := θρext ,r+x :
S × K → RI the relative values. As in Section B.2.2, µ := limη1 →0 µη1 is well-deﬁned. In
addition, note that the limit transition function is the one induced by ρext,0 and ρext,1 on
S × K0 and S × K1 respectively. Since transitions from K0 to K1 (resp., from K1 to K0 )
1
. As a consequence,
occur with probability η1 (resp., η12 ), one has µη1 (S × K1 ) =
1 + η1
lim Eµη1 [λ · r(s, a)] = Eµρext,1 [λ · r(s, a)] > k̄1 (λ) − ε,

η1 →0

hence C’1 hold for η1 small enough.
We turn to C’2. As in Section B.2.2 (see supplementary material online), θ := limη1 →0 θη1
is also well-deﬁned, and for s ∈ S, the diﬀerences θ(s, k0 ) − θ0 (s, k0) and θ(s, k1 ) − θ1 (s, k1 )
are independent of k0 ∈ K0 and k1 ∈ K1 respectively (where θn = θρn ,r+xn for n = 0, 1).
Fix (s, k) ∈ S × K, i ∈ I and s̃i ∈ S i . If k ∈ K0 the strict incentive to report si follows
from the strict truthfulness of (ρext,0 , x0 ), for η1 small enough.
49

Note that φ therefore also depends here on the reports of the players.
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Assume now that k ∈ K1 . If ρ(si , s−i , k) 6= ρ(s̃i , s−i , k) for some s−i ∈ S −i , player i
strictly prefers reporting si over s̃i in Γ(ρext,1 , x1 ).50 And therefore in Γ(ρext , x) as well, for
η1 small enough. Assume ﬁnally that ρ(si , s−i , k) = ρ(s̃i , s−i , k) for all s−i ∈ S −i . Then the
expected payoﬀ of player i in Γ(ρext , x), conditional on the p.r.d. picking k ′ = k is the same
under both reports si and s̃i . On the other hand, conditional on the p.r.d. picking some
a′ ∈ K0 , the expected payoﬀ of player i converges as η1 → 0 to




Ea′ ∼µ(·,s−i ) r i (si , a′ ) + T i (·, s−i ) − γa~′ + Et∼p(·|s,a′) θ0i (t, a′ ) = Ea′ P µ(·,s−i ) θ0i (s, a′ ) + T i (·, s−i )
which, by the choice of η0 , has a strict maximum for si . The strict truthfulness of (ρext , x)
follows, provided η1 is small enough.

We now conclude the proof of Lemma 7. Inspection of the proofs of Claims 8, 9 and
10 shows that the successive modiﬁcations of the transfers preserve strict inequalities and
do not rely on transitions being action-independent. That is, the same sequence of claims
leads here to the existence of x4 : Ωpub × S × K → RI (with Ωpub = S × K × Y ) such that
λ · x4 (·) = 0 and all truth-telling incentives in Γ(ρext , x4 ) are strict.
We ﬁnally add a component to transfers, so as to ensure obedience. This is standard.
By A2, and since λ is not a coordinate direction, there exists for each a ∈ A transfers
xa : Y → RI such that λ · xa (·) = 0, Ey∼p(·|a) xa (y) = 0 and Ey∼p(·|ãi ,a−i ) xia (y) is a large
negative constant for each i ∈ I and ãi 6= ai . We then view the policy ρ : S × K → ∆(A)
as being implemented by means of the p.r.d. that picks a recommended action proﬁle a ∈ A
based on the reports, leading to transfers xa (·). We abbreviate this to xρ : S × K × Y → RI
and ﬁnally set x := x4 + xρ . Since λ · xρ (·) = 0, the expected weighted payoﬀ induced by
ρext in Γ(ρext , x) is
Eµρext [λ · r(s, a)] ≥ k̄1 (λ) − ε,
and the triple (Eµρext [r(s, a)] , ρext , x) is feasible in P1 (λ).
B.2.4

Step 3: λ is a coordinate direction

We continue with the case λ = +ei . The proof involves a variation upon the ideas of Section
B.2.3 but is much simpler. We denote by Mi the MDP faced by the players when jointly
maximizing the payoﬀ of player i. The MDP Mi has S i as state space, A as action set, and
the reward and transitions are r i and p. Plainly, the limit value of Mi is k̄1 (ei ).
Whatever the choice of ω̄pub by nature in Γ(ρext,1 , x1 ). Indeed, player i is ex post indiﬀerent between si
and s̃i when ρ(s) = ρ(s̃i , s−i ) and strictly prefers si over s̃i if ρ(s) = ρ(s̃i , s−i ). The claim thus follows since
the belief of player i over S −i has full support.
50

56

We let an arbitrary ε > 0 be given, and let x̄ : S i × A → R and ρ1 : S i → ∆(A) be
obtained by applying Proposition 5 to Mi . We will obtain strict truth-telling incentives by
means of a perturbation argument. Before doing so, we ﬁrst modify x̄ to get strict obedience
incentives.
We view ρ1 : S → ∆(A) as a map deﬁned over S (independent of s−i ). By A2, for j 6= i
and for each a ∈ A, there exists xa : Y → RI that induce strict obedience to a:
r j (sj , ãj , a−j )+Ep(·|ãj ,a−j ) xja (y)+Ep(·|sj ,ãj ,a−j ) θρj 1 ,r+x̄ (t) < r j (sj , a)+Ep(·|a)xja (y)+Ep(·|sj ,a) θρj 1 ,r+x̄ (t)
(23)
for each s ∈ S and ãj 6= aj .
For j = i, we ask for more. For any si ∈ S i and since ρ1 is optimal in the MDP with
payoﬀ r i + x̄, any action a ∈ A in the support of ρ1 (si ) maximizes
r i (si , a) + x̄(si , a) + Eti ∼p(·|si,a) θρi 1 ,r+x̄ (ti ).
Since kx̄k < ε, the components xia can be chosen so that the following holds:
B1 : (23) is modiﬁed and strengthened to
r i (si , ãi , a−i ) + x̄(s̃i , a) + Ey∼p(·|ãi ,a−i ) xia (y) + Et∼p(·|s,ãi ,a−i ) θρi 1 ,r+x̄ (t)
< r i (si , a) + x̄(si , a) + Ey∼p(·|a) xia (y) + Eti ∼p(·|sj ,a) θρi 1 ,r+x̄ (ti ),
for every s̃i ∈ S i and ãi 6= ai .
B2 kxia k < kε for some constant k that only depends on the primitives of the model and
not on ε.
B3 xia (·) ≤ 0 and Ey∼p(·a) xia (y) is independent of a ∈ A.
The substantive properties are B1 and B2. Once they hold, B3 follows by subtracting a
small constant from xia .
We view ρ1 : S → ∆(A) as being implemented by means of the p.r.d. picking a recommendation a ∼ ρ1 (s), and transfers being then given by xi1 (s, y) := x̄(si , a) + xia (y) and
xj1 (s, y) = xja (y) for j 6= i. The properties of xa and of x̄ ensure that the pair (ρ1 , x1 ) is
strictly obedient and satisfy the same truth-telling incentives as the pair (ρ1 , x̄). Observe
that xi1 (s, y) ≤ (k + 1)ε. Since ρ1 is optimal in the MDP with reward r + x̄, one has


Eµρext ,1 r i (si , a) + xi1 (s, y) ≥ k̄1 (ei ) − (k + 1)ε.
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We now recall the strictly truthful pair (ρext,0 , x0 ) from Step 1 in Section B.2.2. Once
again, we supplement x0 with transfers inducing obedience. For a ∈ A, we let xa : Y → RI
be such that (i) Ep(·|a) xa (y) = 0, and (ii) Ep(·|ãj ,a−j ) xja (y) is a large negative constant for each
j ∈ J and ãj 6= aj . We next subtract the same constant to all maps xia (·) (a ∈ A) to get
xia (·) ≤ 0. (With an abuse of notation), transfers x0 = S × K0 × Y → RI are now deﬁned by
x0 (s, k0 , y) = x0 (s, k0 ) + xa (y) where a ∈ A is selected by the p.r.d. as speciﬁed in (K0 , φ0 ).51
With this updated deﬁnition of x0 , the pair (ρext,0 , x0 ) is both strictly truthful and strictly
obedient.
We now perturb. For η1 > 0, we deﬁne the irreducible extended policy ρext = (ρ, K, φ)
from ρ1 and ρext,0 and transfers x : S × K × Y → RI from x0 and x1 , exactly as ρext
and x were obtained in Step 2 from ρext,1 and ρext,0 . As in Step 2, it follows that for
η1 > 0 small, the pair (ρext , x) is both strictly truthful and obedient –hence the triple
(Eµρext [r(s, a) + x(s, k, y)] , ρext , x) is feasible in P(ei ). Finally, since transitions from ρ1
to ρext,0 (resp., from ρext,0 to ρ1 ) occur with probability η12 (resp., η1 ) in each round, the




expectation Eµρext r i (s, a) + xi (s, k, y) is arbitrarily close to Eµρext,1 r i (s, a) + xi1 (s, a) for
η1 > 0 small enough. The result follows.
The case λ = −ei is analogous. Let ā−i ∈ A−i achieve the min in the deﬁnition of v i .
Let next M̃i be the MDP faced by player i when maximizing his own payoﬀs against the
constant policy ā−i . Hence M̃i has S i as state space, Ai as action set, and the rewards and
transitions in M̃i are deduced from r i and p given ā−i . We then repeat the proof of the case
λ = +ei .52

C

Proof of Theorem 5

The overall pattern of the proof is that of the proofs of Theorems 2 and 4. We let a compact
set Z be given, included in the interior of W . Given z ∈ Z, we construct a sequential
equilibrium σ with payoﬀ z. Under σ, the play is divided in a sequence of phases. In each
phase, a direction λ ∈ Λ is selected as a function of public past play. If λ is not close to
some negative coordinate direction −ei , the players follow as before some extended policy
51

Recall from Section B.2.2 that the p.r.d. sets a ∈ A to be equal to k0 with probability 1 − η0 and
otherwise draws a ∼ µ(s).
52
With obvious changes. Transfers xi to player i are now required to be non-negative.
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and the phase is of random duration. If instead λ is close to −ei for some i ∈ I, players
play an equilibrium in an auxiliary “zero-sum” game (between i and −i) with ﬁxed duration
1
, ﬁnal transfers and no communication (i.e., reports are babbling).53 These
T := √
1−δ
“zero-sum” games are deﬁned and studied in Section F.1 below.
One new issue however arises. The equilibrium behavior in such a punishment phase
depends on the continuation relative values at the end of the phase, which are themselves
deﬁned recursively from past public play –raising a potential circularity issue. To deal with
it, we will insert a shorter transition phase at the end of each punishment phase, so as to
ensure that the continuation values following punishment phases are predetermined. Given
this change, we ﬁnd it conceptually and technically more straightforward to insert such a
transition phase between any two phases. Modulo this change, the proof will follow along
earlier lines.

D

Proof of Theorem 6

In Sections A.1 and B.2, the independence and private values assumptions are only used to
obtain triples (v, ρ, x) and (v, ρext , x) with strict truth-telling incentives, see Lemmas 3 and
7. Since all truth-telling incentives are required to be strict in the optimization program P2 ,
the analog of the latter two lemmas readily holds here, and the result follows as in Section
A.1.

53

The exponent − 21 is somewhat arbitrary. What matters is that T ≪
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1
1−δ

so that δ T → 1 as δ → 1.

Supplementary Material: Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic
Bayesian Games,
Johannes Hörner, Satoru Takahashi, Nicolas Vieille
This supplement contains additional material on Markov Decision Problems and details on
the proof of Theorem 5.

E
E.1

Markov Decision Problems
The ACOE

For the reader’s convenience, we provide a statement and a self-contained proof of the Average
Cost Optimality Equation for MDPs. The material in this section is standard.
We let an irreducible MDP M with ﬁnite primitives be given. The state space is S,
the action set is A, the reward function is r : S × A → R, and the transition function is
p(· | s, a).54 We let Σ denote the set of strategies in M.
For δ < 1 and N ∈ N, we let
"
#
∞
X
vδ (s) := max Es,σ (1 − δ)
δ n−1 r(sn , an )
σ∈Σ

n=1

and
vN (s) := max Es,σ
σ∈Σ

"

N
1 X
r(sn , an )
N n=1

#

denote the values of the discounted and ﬁnite horizon versions of M, as a function of the
initial state s.
Proposition 6 (ACOE) There is a unique v ∈ R and a unique (up to an additive constant)
map θ : S → R such that

v + θ(s) = max r(s, a) + Ep(·|s,a)θ(·) , for all s ∈ S.
a∈A

(24)

In addition, v = limδ→1 vδ (s) = limN →+∞ vN (s) for all s ∈ S.
54

We are thus assuming that the sets S and A are ﬁnite and that for each policy ρ : S → ∆(A), the
induced Markov chain (sn ) is irreducible.
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Proof. We ﬁrst prove the existence of a solution to (24). For δ < 1 the dynamic
programming principle writes

vδ (s) = max (1 − δ)r(s, a) + δEp(·|s,a)vδ (·) , for all s ∈ S.
a∈A

(25)

Let a∗ (s) achieves the maximum in (25), so that vδ (s) = (1 − δ)r(s, a∗(s)) + δEp(·|s,a∗s ) vδ (·) for
each s. This implies that δ 7→ vδ (s) is a bounded and rational function on [0, 1). In particular,
vδ (s) − v(s)
both v(s) := limδ→1 vδ (s) and θ(s) := lim
exist. Irreducibility readily implies
δ→1
1−δ
that v(s) is independent of s.
Equation (25) then rewrites as

v + (vδ (s) − v) = max (1 − δ)r(s, a) + δEp(·|s,a) [vδ (t) − v] + δv .
a∈A

Equation (24) follows when dividing by 1 − δ and letting δ → 1.
We next prove uniqueness, and start with v. Let (v, θ) be a solution to (24), so that

θ(s) = max r(s, a) + Ep(·|s,a)θ(·) − v.
a∈A

(26)

Substituting (26) into the right-hand side of (24) yields ﬁrst

2v + θ(s) = max Es,σ [r(s1 , a1 ) + r(s2 , a2 ) + θ(s3 )] ,
σ

and, by induction,
#
"
N
θ(sN +1 )
1 X
θ(s)
r(sn , an ) +
= max Es,σ
v+
σ
N
N n=1
N
for each N. This implies that limN →∞ vN (s) exists and is equal to v.
We conclude with the uniqueness of θ. Let (v, θ) and (v, ψ) be two solutions to (24).
This implies
θ(s) − ψ(s) ≤ max Ep(·|s,a) (θ(·) − ψ(·))
a∈A

for each s. By irreducibility, it follows that θ(·) − ψ(·) is constant.

E.2

Perturbed Markov Chains and Relative Values

We discuss here two statements on the asymptotic properties of relative values of perturbed
Markov chains, as the perturbation parameter converges to zero. These statements readily
imply those used in the main body of the paper.
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E.2.1

Result 1

The setup is as follows. Let be given (disjoint) sets Sl , with 1 ≤ l ≤ L. Let also be given, for
each l, an irreducible transition function pl on Sl , with invariant measure νl , and a “payoﬀ”
rl : Sl → R with Eνl [rl (s)] = 0. Let θl : Sl → R denote the associated relative value.
In addition, let p be an irreducible transition function on S := S1 ∪ · · · ∪ SL , and let
r : S → R be the function that coincides with rl on Sl . For ε > 0, we deﬁne a transition
function pε on S as pε (t | s) := (1 − ε)pl (t | s) + εp(t | s) for s ∈ Sl and t ∈ S. Let µε ∈ ∆(S)
be the invariant measure of pε , γε := Eµε [r(s)] the long-run payoﬀ, and θε : S → R the
relative value. To ﬁx ideas, we normalize θε by imposing the condition Eµε [θε (·)] = 0.
Proposition 7 The map ε 7→ θε is bounded. In addition,
lim (θε (s′ ) − θε (s)) = θl (s′ ) − θl (s) for every s, s′ ∈ Sl .

ε→0

Proof. We view each transition pε (· | s) as the succession of two random choices. First,
it is randomly decided, with probability ε, whether to use p or pl to draw the next state,
which is next drawn accordingly. We denote by τ the random time of first “switch” (ﬁrst
round where p is used).
Given any two states s, s′ ∈ S we denote by (sn ) and (s′n ) two Markov chains with
transition functions pε starting from s and s′ respectively, which are coupled in that (i) the
successive switches occur in the same rounds for the two chains, and (ii) sn = s′n after the
ﬁrst coincidence time ω := inf{n : sn = s′n }; yet all other random choices are independent.
Claim 13 The following holds:
• There exists c1 > 0 such that E

" τ −1
X
n=1

#

(r(sn ) − r(s′n )) ≤ c1 for all s, s′ ∈ S and ε > 0.

• There exists c2 > 0 such that P(ω ≤ τ ) ≥ c2 for every l, s, s′ ∈ Sl and 0 < ε ≤ 12 .
Proof of the claim. Let s ∈ S be given, say s ∈ Sl . One has, with obvious notations
!
!
τ −1
τ −1
X
X
Eε
r(sn ) = El
r(sn ) .
n=1

n=1

By the ACOE, the latter is equal to θl (s) − El [θl (sτ )] and is therefore bounded as a function
of ε.
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The second statement follows from the irreducibility of pl .55
Next, we denote by (τk ) the successive switches – so that τ1 = τ . Given s, s′ ∈ S,
denote by φ the smallest index k such that sτk +1 and s′τk +1 belong to the same component
Sl . Because p is irreducible, there exists c3 > 0 such that P(φ ≤ L) ≥ c3 . Note that
"τL+1
#
X
θε (s) = E
(r(sn ) − γε ) + θε (sτL+1 +1 )
n=1

and a similar equality holds for θε (s′ ), hence
"τL+1
#
h
i
X
θε (s′ ) − θε (s) = E
(r(sn ) − r(s′n )) + E θε (s′τL+1 +1 ) − θε (sτL+1 +1 )
n=1

≤ Lc1 + max
(θε (t′ ) − θε (t)) × P(ω > τL+1 )
′
t,t ∈S

≤ Lc1 + (1 − c2 c3 ) max
(θε (t′ ) − θε (t)) ,
′
t,t ∈S

using the previous claim. It follows that maxs,s′ ∈S |θε (s′ ) − θε (s)| ≤

equality Eµε θε (·) = 0, this implies the ﬁrst statement.

Lc1
. Together with the
c2 c3

For ε > 0, θε is the unique solution to the linear system (s ∈ Sl , l ≤ L)
γε + θε (s) = r(s) + (1 − ε)Epl (·|s) θε (t) + εEp(·|s)θε (t),
together with the normalization equation.56 Therefore, θε (s) is a bounded and rational
function of s. Thus, θ(s) := limε→0 θε (s) exists and satisﬁes the limit system obtained when
setting ε = 0. That is, for ﬁxed l and for each s ∈ Sl , one has
θ(s) = r(s) + Ep(l (·|s) θ(t).
All solutions of the latter system are equal to θl up to an additive constant, hence the result.

E.2.2

Result 2

The setup here is a variant of the previous one. We let be given two (disjoint) sets S1 and S2 ,
an irreducible transition function pl on Sl with invariant measure νl , a function rl : Sl → R
55

P(ω ≤ τ ) is continuous as a function of ε, converges to 1 as ε → 0, and is less than one, except for ε = 1.
Since µε is the unique solution of a linear system with coeﬃcients linear in ε, ε 7→ µε is a rational
function, hence ε 7→ γε is a rational function as well.
56
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(l = 1, 2) and θl the relative value. In addition, let f : S := S1 ∪ S2 → S be such that
f (S1 ) ⊆ S2 and f (S2 ) ⊆ S1 and let r : S → R be the map whose restriction to Sl is rl .
For ε = (ε1 , ε2 ) ∈ (0, 1)2 , we deﬁne a transition function pε over S by pε (t | s) =
(1 − εl )pl (t | s) + εl f (s) for s ∈ Sl . Thus, transitions from S1 to S2 (resp., from S2 to S1 )
occur with probability ε1 (resp., ε2 ) in each round. Let θε : S → R denote the relative value.
Proposition 8 One has limε→0 (θε (s′ ) − θε (s)) = θl (s′ ) − θl (s) whenever s, s′ ∈ Sl .
Note however that θε is unbounded as a function of ε as soon as Eν1 r1 (·) 6= Eν2 r2 (·).
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that ε 7→ θε (s′ ) − θε (s) is bounded whenever s, s′ ∈ Sl . We use the
same notations as in the proof of Proposition 7, and let (sn ) and (s′n ) be two Markov chains
starting from s and s′ , with t.f. pε , and coupled as before. The constants c1 and c2 are as
before. Whenever s, s′ ∈ Sl (and for εl bounded away from one), one has P(ω ≤ τ ) ≥ c2 ,
hence
|θε (s′ ) − θε (s)| ≤ c1 + (1 − c2 ) max
|θε (t′ ) − θε (t)| .
′
t,t ∈S3−l

c1
.
c2
The limit claim follows as in the proof of Proposition 7.

It follows that maxl=1,2 maxs,s′∈Sl |θε (s′ ) − θε (s)| ≤

E.3

Proof of Proposition 5

We let an irreducible MDP M0 be given, with primitives (Ω, B, q, r). We denote by v ∈ R
and θ : Ω → R the limit value and relative values of M0 . For ω ∈ Ω, we let

B0 (ω) := argmaxb∈B r(ω, b) + Eω′ ∼q(·|ω,b) θ(ω ′)

be the set of actions that are optimal at ω ∈ Ω.
Thus, for ω ∈ Ω and b ∈
/ B0 (ω), one has r(ω, b) + Eq(·|ω,b)θ(ω ′ ) < v + θ(ω), and we let
c0 > 0 be strictly smaller than the diﬀerence between the two sides, for each ω and b ∈
/ B0 (ω).
In the absence of transfers, assume that the second agent uses a distribution ρ(ω) ∈
∆(B0 (ω)) with full support, as a function of the report ω of the ﬁrst agent. At state ω,
it is strictly better to report truthfully ω rather than ω̃ unless B(ω̃) ⊆ B(ω). The main
issue below will be to get rid of such indiﬀerence cases, and to prevent the ﬁrst agent from
reporting a state ω̃ with B(ω̃) ⊂ B(ω). The basic insight in the proof is to reward the ﬁrst
agent for reporting a state with many optimal actions.
We will construct a ﬁnite sequence M1 , . . . , Mn of perturbed MDPs. For all MDPs in
the sequence, the state space is Ω and the action set is B.
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We explain the construction of M1 before proceeding to the general case. Throughout,
1
(so that φ(m) < m1
we ﬁx an increasing function φ : {1, . . . , |B|} → R such that φ(|B|) < |B|
1
−φ(|B|) and (ii) α < φ(m+1)−φ(m)
for m ≤ |B|). We then pick α > 0 such that (i) α <
|B|
for all 1 ≤ m < |B|.
Given ε1 > 0, the reward r1 and transition function q1 of M1 are deﬁned as
r1 (ω, b) := (1 − ε1 )r(ω, b) + ε1 (r(ω, β0(ω)) + c0 φ(|B0 (ω)|)) ,
and
q1 (· | ω, b) := (1 − ε1 )q(· | ω, b) + ε1 q(· | ω, β0 (ω)),
where β0 (ω) is the uniform distribution over B0 (ω). We denote by vε1 and θε1 the limit value
and relative values of M1 , and we let

B1 (ω) := argmaxb∈B r1 (ω, b) + Eω′ ∼q1 (·|ω,b) θ(ω ′ )

be the set of optimal actions at ω in M1 . Both vε1 and θε1 are continuous w.r.t. ε1 , with
limε1 →0 vε1 = v and limε1 →0 θε1 = θ. Hence B1 (ω) is upper hemi-continuous as a function of
ε1 , so that B1 (ω) ⊆ B0 (ω) for all ε1 > 0 small enough, and ω ∈ Ω. We stop with the MDP
M1 if there is a sequence ε1 → 0 such that B1 (·) = B0 (·) along the sequence. We otherwise
repeat the perturbation process with M1 .
P
More generally, let (εk )k∈N be a sequence of positive real numbers with k εk < 1. For
k ∈ N, we set ~εk := (ε1 , . . . , εk ). For any such sequence (εk ), we deﬁne inductively a sequence
Mk (~εk ) of MDPs with state space Ω and action set B, and with limit value denoted v~εk and
θ~εk . The reward rk and transition function qk of Mk (~εk ) are deﬁned as
!
k
k
X
X
rk (ω, b) := 1 −
εi r(ω, b) +
εi (r(ω, βi−1(ω)) + ci−1 φ(|Bi−1 (ω)|)) ,
i=1

i=1

and
qk (· | ω, b) =

1−

k
X
i=1

!

εi q(· | ω, b) +

k
X
i=1

εi q(· | ω, βi−1 (ω)),

where βi (ω), Bi (ω) and ci are deﬁned inductively as follows.
For each i,
Bi (ω) := argmaxb {ri (ω, b) + Eω′ ∼qi (·|ω,b) θ~εi (ω ′ )}
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is the set of actions optimal at ω in Mi (~εi ), βi (ω) ∈ ∆(B) is the uniform distribution over
Bi (ω) and ci > 0 is any number such that
ci + ri (ω, b) + Eω′ ∼qi (·|ω,b) θ~εi (ω ′ ) < v~εi + θ~εi (ω)
for each ω ∈ Ω and b ∈
/ Bi (ω). This deﬁnition entails no circularity. Indeed, B0 , β0 and c0
are associated with M0 and, for k ≥ 1, the deﬁnition of rk and qk , and therefore of v~εk , θ~εk ,
Bk , βk and ck , only involves v~εi and θ~εi for i < k.
Note also that, for given ~εk−1 , v~εk and θ~εk are continuous as functions of εk , and Bk (ω) is
therefore upper hemi continuous. It follows that, for every ~εk−1 , one has Bk (ω) ⊆ Bk−1 (ω)
provided εk > 0 is small enough. In addition, limεk →0 v~εk = v~εk−1 and limεk →0 θ~εk = θ~εk−1 .
In the sequel, we let a sequence (εk ) be given such that for each k, εk is “very close to
zero” given ~εk−1 . By this, we will mean that (i) |v~εk −v~εk−1 | and kθ~εk −θ~εk−1 k are smaller than
some positive numbers which only involve ~εk−1 (and which will appear in the computations
below), and (ii) Bk (ω) ⊂ Bk−1 (ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
We let n ∈ N be such that Bn (·) = Bn−1 (·), and we deﬁne ρ : Ω → ∆(B) as
!
n
n
X
X
εk βk−1 (ω).
εk βn (ω) +
ρ(ω) := 1 −
k=1

k=1

Observe that supp ρ(ω) = B0 (ω) for each ω. We next deﬁne xeq : Ω × B → R as follows:
• for b ∈ B0 (ω), xeq (ω, b) is deﬁned by the equation
xeq (ω, b) + r(ω, b) + Eω′ ∼q(·|ω,b) θ~εn (ω ′) = r(ω, ρ(ω) + Eω′ ∼q(·ω,ρ(ω) θ~εn (ω ′).
Observe that xeq (ω, ρ(ω)) = Eb∼ρ(ω) xeq (ω, b) = 0 for each ω.
• For b ∈
/ B0 (ω), we set xeq (ω, b) = xeq (ω, b̄), where b̄ ∈ Bn (ω). Note that xeq (ω, b) is
independent of the choice of b̄. Indeed, the actions of Bn (ω) are those that maximize
rn (ω, ·) + Eqn(·|ω,·) θ~εn (ω ′ ), or equivalently, that maximize r(ω, ·) + Eq(·|ω,·) θ~εn (ω ′ ).
Finally, we deﬁne x : Ω × B → R as
x(ω, b) := xeq (ω, b) +

n
X

εk ck−1 φ(|Bk−1(ω)|).

k=1

We now prove that the pair (ρ, x) satisﬁes the desired properties.
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Claim 14 ρ is an optimal policy in the MDP with stage payoff r(ω, b) + x(ω, b).
Proof. Recall that v~εn and θ~εn are the limit value and relative values of the MDP
Mn (~εn ), and that Bn (ω) is the set of actions optimal at ω. Therefore, for each ω and by the
ACOE, one has
v~εn + θ~εn (ω) = rn (ω, βn (ω)) + Eqn(·|ω,βn (ω) θ~εn (ω ′).
Given the deﬁnition of rn , qn and ρ(ω), the right-hand side is also equal to
r(ω, ρ(ω)) + x(ω, ρ(ω)) + Eq(·|ω,ρ(ω) θ~εn (ω ′ ).
Next, it follows from the deﬁnition of xeq that
r(ω, b) + x(ω, b) + Eq(·|ω,b θ~εn (ω ′ )
is independent of b ∈ supp ρ(ω) = B0 (ω).
On the other hand, for b ∈
/ B0 (ω) and b̄ ∈ Bn (ω), one has rn (ω, b) + Eqn(·|ω,b) θ~εn (ω ′ ) <
rn (ω, b̄) + Eqn(·|ω,b̄) θ~εn (ω ′ ), which implies r(ω, b) + Eq(·|ω,b) θ~εn (ω ′) < r(ω, b̄) + Eq(·|ω,b̄) θ~εn (ω ′ ),
which yields in turn
r(ω, b) + x(ω, b) + Eq(·|ω,b) θ~εn (ω ′ ) < r(ω, b̄) + x(ω, b̄) + Eq(·|ω,b̄) θ~εn (ω ′).
Together, these observations yield

v~εn + θ~εn = max r(ω, b) + x(ω, b) + Eq(·|ω,b) θ~εn (ω ′ ) ,
b∈B

with the maximum being achieved by ρ(ω). This proves the claim.
Claim 15 For every ω, ω̃ ∈ Ω, one has

r(ω, ρ(ω))+x(ω, ρ(ω))+Eq(·|ω,ρ(ω))θ~εn (ω ′) ≥ r(ω, ρ(ω̃))+x(ω̃, ρ(ω̃))+Eq(·|ω,ρ(ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ′ ), (27)
with a strict inequality if ρ(ω) 6= ρ(ω ′).
Proof. Fix ω, ω̃ ∈ Ω. Note that ρ(ω) = ρ(ω̃) if and only if Bk (ω) = Bk (ω̃) for k =
0, . . . , n. Assume ﬁrst that ρ(ω) = ρ(ω̃). Then, using xeq (ω, ρ(ω)) = 0, one has
x(ω, ρ(ω) =

n
X

εk ck−1 φ(|Bk−1(ω)|)

k=1

=

n
X

εk ck−1 φ(|Bk−1(ω̃)|) = x(ω̃, ρ(ω̃)).

k=1
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Thus, (27) holds with equality.
Assume next that ρ(ω) 6= ρ(ω̃), and denote by k̄ the smallest k such that Bk (ω) 6= Bk (ω̃).
Since Bn = Bn−1 , one has k̄ < n. We prove that (27) holds with a strict inequality by
looking at the decomposition of ρ as a weighted sum of the uniform distributions βk .
• For k < k̄, one has βk (ω) = βk (ω̃), hence
r(ω, βk (ω))+ck φ(|Bk (ω)|)+Eq(·|ω,βk(ω)) θ~εn (ω ′) = r(ω, βk (ω̃))+ck φ(|Bk (ω̃)|)+Eq(·|ω,βk (ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ′ ).
• For k̄ < k < n, we will rely on the assumption that εk is quite small compared to
εk̄ . Plainly, one has, for some constant C which only depends on the primitives of the
MDP
r(ω, βk (ω)) + ck φ(|Bk (ω)|) + Eq(·|ω,βk (ω)) θ~εn (ω ′ )
≥ r(ω, βk (ω̃)) + ck φ(|Bk (ω̃)|) + Eq(·|ω,βk (ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ′) − C.
Hence, when multiplied by εk̄+1 , the diﬀerence between the two sides of the latter
inequality is very small compared to εk̄+1 , and in particular less that αεk̄+1 ck̄ .
• For k = n, and since Bn (ω) are the actions optimal at ω in Mn (~εn ), one has as noted
previously,
r(ω, βn (ω)) + Eq(·|ω,βn(ω)) θ~εn (ω ′ ) ≥ r(ω, βn(ω̃)) + Eq(·|ω,βn(ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ′ ).
We are left with k̄ = k, and distinguish two cases. Assume ﬁrst that b ∈
/ Bk̄ (ω) for some
b ∈ Bk̄ (ω̃). In that case,
r(ω, βk̄ (ω)) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω)) θ~εk̄ (ω ′ ) > r(ω, βk̄ (ω̃)) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω̃)) θ~εk̄ (ω ′ ) + ck̄ ×

|Bk̄ (ω̃) \ Bk̄ (ω)|
|Bk̄ (ω̃)|

(because all actions in Bk̄ (ω̃) \ Bk̄ (ω) are played with probability |B 1(ω̃)| and each leads to
k̄
a loss of at least ck̄ ). Since εk̄+1 , . . . , εn are small (given εk̄ ), the latter inequality still holds
when θ~εn is substituted to ~εk̄ . This implies
r(ω, βk̄ (ω)) + ck̄ φ(|Bk̄ (ω)|) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω)) θ~εn (ω ′ )
′

> r(ω, βk̄ (ω̃)) + ck̄ φ(|Bk̄ (ω̃)|) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ) + ck̄



> r(ω, βk̄ (ω̃)) + ck̄ φ(|Bk̄ (ω̃)|) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω̃)) θ~εn (ω ′ ) + ck̄ α,
using property (i) of α.
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1
+ φ(|Bk̄ (ω)|) − φ(|Bk̄ (ω̃)|)
|Bk̄ (ω̃)|



Assume now that Bk̄ (ω̃) is a strict subset of Bk̄ (ω), so that
r(ω, βk̄ (ω)) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω)) θ~εk (ω ′ ) = r(ω, βk̄ (ω̃)) + Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω̃)) θ~εk (ω ′ ),
because βk (ω) is optimal in Mk (~εk ). This implies
r(ω, βk̄ (ω))+ck̄ φ(|Bk̄ (ω)|)+Eq(·|ω,βk̄(ω)) θ~εk (ω ′) > r(ω, βk̄ (ω̃))+ck̄ φ(|Bk̄ (ω̃)|)+Eq(·|ω,βk̄ (ω̃)) θ~εk (ω ′)+αck̄ ,
using property (ii) of α.
Since θ~εn is very close to θ~εk , the latter inequality still holds true when θ~εn is substituted
to θ~εk̄ . The desired inequality follows by summing over all k = 1, . . . , n.

F

Proof of Theorem 5

Most computations in Section F.2 will be omitted. Transition phases will rely on the strictly
truthful pair (ρext,0 , x0 ) constructed in Section B.2.2, with K0 = A and ρ0 : S × K0 → A.
We supplement the transfers x0 of Section B.2.2 with transfers x̄0 : K0 × Y → RI which
induce obedience to ρ0 , and still denote by x0 : S × K0 × Y → RI the total transfers. We
abbreviate the relative values θρ0 ,r+x0 to θ0 , and we let r̄ ≥ 1 be a uniform bound on r and
θ0 .

F.1

Auxiliary Zero-Sum Games

Throughout this section, we ﬁx a player i ∈ I, and will introduce games between i and −i.
W.l.o.g., all strategies of player i are here “babbling.”
F.1.1

Preliminaries

For k ∈ N and j 6= i, we let Ajk ⊂ ∆(Aj ) be a ﬁnite, k1 -dense subset of ∆(Aj ). That is, for
each αj ∈ ∆(Aj ), there exists αkj ∈ Ajk such that kαj − αkj kL1 < k1 . We let Σjk be the set
of repeated game strategies of player j with the property that the mixed action of j in each
i
round n belongs to Ajk and only depends on the past public signals y1i , . . . , yn−1
relative to
−i
player i. We set Σk := ×j6=i Σik , and let
γδi (si , σ i , σ −i )
wki := lim min−i max
i
δ→1 σ−i ∈Σ

k

σ
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57
be the long-run minmax payoﬀ when players −i are constrained to strategies in Σ−i
k .
Thanks to the irreducibility assumption, there exists c > 0 such that the following holds: for
each k ∈ N, j 6= i and each strategy σ j , there exists σkj ∈ Σjk such that
c
γδj (s, σ −j , σkj ) < γδj (s, σ) + ,
k

for every δ < 1 and σ −j .58 Hence, limk→+∞ wki = w i .
Since strategies of player −i ignore (ynj ) (j 6= i), we may restrict ourselves to strategies
of player i which are independent as well of the public signals (ynj ), j 6= i, relative to other
players.
Let an arbitrary state s̄i ∈ S i be given, and k ∈ N be ﬁxed. Given an horizon T ∈ N, we
let Gik (s̄i , T ) be the zero-sum game with T rounds between i and −i with no communication,
T
1X i i
r (sn , an ) and where players −i are restricted to Σ−i
initial state s̄i , payoﬀ
k . Denote by
T n=1
"
#
T
X
1
Es̄i ,σ
r i (sin , an )
(28)
wki (T ) := min−i max
σi
T n=1
σ−i ∈Σk
the minmax of Gi (s̄i , T ). Using irreducibility, one has limT →+∞ wki (T ) = wki for each s̄i .

Given k and T , we ﬁx a strategy proﬁle σk−i ∈ Σ−i
k that achieves the minimum in (28).
−i
−i
−i
For αk ∈ Ak , let T (αk ) be the (random) set of rounds in which σk−i prescribes αk−i , and
let fα−i ∈ ∆(Y ) denote the empirical distribution of the public signals received in T (αk−i ).
k
Intuitively, if some player j 6= i is playing according to σkj , the signals (ynj ) received in
T (αk−i ) are i.i.d., and drawn from pj (· | αkj ). Hence, whenever |T (αk−i )| is large and with high
probability, fα−i should be close to the distribution gαj −i ∈ ∆(Y ) deﬁned as
k

k

gαj −i (y)
k

= fα−i (y −j )pj (y j | αkj ).
k

This motivates the deﬁnition of
D j :=

X

−i
α−i
k ∈Ak

|T (αk−i )|
kfα−i − gαj −i kL1 .
k
k
T

Claim 16 below formalizes this intuition. In words, and provided that T is large enough,
j
player j can ensure that D j < ε with high probability by playing σk,T
.
It is independent of si .
This assertion also relies on the product monitoring assumption. Under this assumption, public communication and public signals ynj relative to j 6= i cannot be used by players −i as a means to privately
correlate their actions against −i.
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Claim 16 Given ε > 0, there exists T0 ≥ 0 such that
Pσ j

k,T ,σ

−j

(D j > ε) < ε,

for all T ≥ T0 , j 6= i and σ −j .
Claim 16 follows from Gossner (1995), who uses Blackwell’s theory of approachability.
It will be combined with the claim below, which asserts that player i is eﬀectively punished
when all players j 6= i pass the test D j < ε with high probability.
Claim 17 Let ε > 0 and T be given, and let σ be a strategy profile such that Pσ (D j > ε) < ε
for each j 6= i. Then
" N
#
1X i i
i
r (sn , an ) < wk,T
+ r̄(I + 2)ε.
Es̄i,σ
T n=1
Proof. On the event D −i := ∩j6=i {D j ≤ ε} one has
each j 6= i, which implies, by repeated substitution,
X |T (α−i )|
k

T

A−i
k

X
y

X |T (α−i )|
k

A−i
k

T

kfα−i − gαj −i kL1 ≤ ε, for

|fα−i (y) − fα−i (y i ) ×j6=i pj (y j | αkj )|
k

k

k

!

k

< Iε.

We ﬁx now an arbitrary private history (sin , ain , yn ) of player i, and compare the realized payoﬀ
n
1X i i i
j
g (sn , an , yn ) to its “expectation,” assuming (ynj ) are drawn using σk,T
. Formally,
T n=1


n
X
X
X
X
1
1
g i (sin , ain , yn ) −
g i (sin , ain , yn ) =
g i (sin , ain , ỹ −i , yni ) × p−i (ỹ −i | αk−i )
T n=1
T −i
−i
−i
−i
ỹ

Ak T (αk )

+

∈Y

1 X X X i i i −i i
g (sn , an , ỹ , yn ) × p−i (ỹ −i | αk−i ).
T −i
−i
−i
Ak T (αk ) ỹ

#
T
X
1
r i (sin , an ) ≤
The expectation of the second term is independent of σ −i and is equal to Es̄i,σi ,σ−i
k,T
T n=1
wki (T ). Since the ﬁrst term is bounded by 2r̄, and by r̄Iε on the event D −i , the result follows.
"
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F.1.2

Auxiliary Games

1
. Given δ < 1, transfers x : S × Y T → RI ,
1−δ
and a state proﬁle s ∈ S, we let G(s, δ, x) denote the game of T rounds (ending after the
draw of sT +1 ), with initial state proﬁle s, no communication, and with payoﬀ
( T
)
1 − δ X n−1
δ r(sn , an ) + δ T x(s, ~y ) + δ T θ0 (sT +1 , ā0 ) ,
1 − δ T n=1
From now on and given δ < 1, we set T := √

where ~y := (y1 , . . . , yT ) is the sequence of public signals received along the play, and ā0 ∈ A
is ﬁxed.
The following result will serve as the building block of the equilibrium construction of
punishment phases.
Lemma 13 Given ε > 0, there exists κ∗ ∈ R and δ∗ < 1 such that for all δ > δ∗ , there exist
x : S × Y T → RI and γ ∈ RI with the following properties:
(a) For all s ∈ S, γ is a sequential equilibrium payoff of G(s, δ, x);
(b) γ i < w i + ε;
(c) xi ≥ 0 and kxk ≤ κ∗ T .
ε
. Choose k ∈ N such that |wki − w i | < ε′ ,
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given and pick ε′ < 2r̄(I+5)
4r̄
choose C > ′ , and apply Claim 16 with ε′ to get T0 . We will show that the result holds
ε
with κ∗ := 2C and δ∗ < 1 large enough so that (i) T ≥ T0 , (ii) |wki − wki (T )| < ε′ (for each
1−δ
s̄i ), (iii)
C < 1 and both inequalities displayed below hold for each δ > δ∗ :
1 − δT

−δ T r̄ −

T
X
n=1

δ n−1 r̄ + δ T CT (1 − ε′ ) >

T
X
n=1

δ n−1 r̄ + δ T C(1 − 2ε′ ) + δ T r̄,

(29)

and for each sequence (u1 , . . . , uT ),
T
T
1X
1 − δ X n−1
un < ε′ max(u1 , . . . , uT ).
δ un −
1 − δ T n=1
T n=1

Let δ > δ∗ be arbitrary, and deﬁne x∗ : Y T → RI by xi∗ (·) = 0 and xj∗ (~y ) = −CT if
D j > ε′ and xj∗ (~y ) = 0 otherwise, so that kx∗ (·)k ≤ 21 κ∗ T and xi∗ (·) ≥ 0.
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Given s ∈ S, let σs be any sequential equilibrium of G(s, δ, x∗ ), with payoﬀ γs (σs ) ∈ RI .
By the choice of C and δ∗ , one has Ps,σ (D j > ε′ ) < 2ε′ for every j 6= i.59 Therefore, by
Claim 17, one has
#
"
T
X
1
r i (sin , an ) < wki + ε′ + 2r̄(I + 2)ε′,
Es,σ
T n=1

which implies

γsi (σs ) < w i + 2r̄(I + 4)ε′.
Since Ps (D j > ε′ ) < 2ε′ for each j 6= i, it follows from the speciﬁcation of x∗ and δ∗ that
kγs (σs )k ≤ 14r̄. Set then x̄j (s) := maxs′ ∈S γsj′ (σs′ ) − γsj (σs ) for each s ∈ S and j ∈ I, and
x(s, ~y ) := x∗ (~y ) + x̄(s).
Plainly, σs is still a sequential equilibrium of G(s, δ, x) for each s, and the payoﬀ vector
induced by σs is now independent of s. Moreover, since 0 ≤ x̄(·) ≤ 14r̄, and by the choice of
ε′ , both (b) and (c) hold as well.
We denote by Gεi the compact set of all accumulation points of such equilibrium payoﬀs
γ ∈ RI , as δ → 1. Before we move on to the equilibrium construction, two remarks are
in order. Note ﬁrst that property (c) can be strengthened to xi (·) ≥ ε′′ , where ε′′ < ε is
arbitrary. (Indeed, for given 0 < ε′′ < ε, it suﬃces to ﬁrst apply the current version of
Lemma 13 with ε − ε′′ , and then add ε′′ to xi ).
Because of irreducibility, there is a constant c (which only depends on the primitives of
the game) such that, for j ∈ I, s ∈ S and tj ∈ S j , the highest payoﬀ achievable by j against
σs−j in the two games G(tj , s−j , δ, x(s, ·)) and G(s, δ, x(s, ·)) diﬀer by at most (1 − δ)c. Since
the latter payoﬀ is equal to γ j , the former does not exceed γ j + (1 − δ)c. Since γ j is also the
payoﬀ induced by σtj ,s−j in the game G(tj , s−j , δ, x(tj , s−j , ·)), this implies that the beneﬁt
to player j of pretending that his initial state is sj when it is tj is bounded by (1 − δ)c.

F.2

Equilibrium Construction

We only provide a sketch. We start as in Section B.2. To unify notations, we set k̂1 (λ) =
k̄1 (λ) for λ 6= −ei and k̂1 (−ei ) = −w i for i ∈ I. Since k̂1 (·) is lower semi-continuous on Λ,
there exists ε0 > 0 such that
∀λ ∈ Λ, max λ · z + 2ε0 < k̂1 (λ).
Zη

Indeed, by (29), any strategy σ̃ j such that Pσ̃j ,σ−j (Dj > ε′ ) < ε′ is strictly preferred to any strategy σ̃ j
j
such that Pσ̃j ,σ−j (Dj > ε′ ) > 2ε′ . And σk,T
satisﬁes the former condition by Claim 16.
59
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For each player i, we apply Lemma 13 with 0 < ε′0 < ε0 (so that xi (·) ≥ ε′0 ) and get κ∗ and
ε′
δ∗ . We next pick ε′′0 < 0 . With these choices, for ﬁxed i and δ > δ∗ , the payoﬀ vector γ and
κ∗
the transfers x satisfy γ i < w i + ε0, kxk < κ∗ T , and λ · x∗ (·) ≤ 0 whenever kλ − (−ei )k < ε′′0 .
Parameters are chosen as follows. We ﬁrst pick the parameter 0 < β < 12 of the length
of transition phases, next choose κ to be large enough. Next, as before, pick ε > 0 small
enough. Finally, we choose δ̄ < 1 high enough. Computations are highly similar to those in
Sections A.1.2 and A.1.3. They are therefore omitted, and we do not list conditions to be
satisﬁed by κ, ε and δ̄.
We let z ∈ Z be given, and let π1 ∈ ×i ∆(S i ) be the distribution of the initial state.
The play is divided in a sequence of phases, with odd phases being transition phases. Slight
adjustments in the strategies are needed (as compared with Section A.1.2), and we detail
the updating from one transition phase to the following transition phase. The transition
phase k starts with with a target payoﬀ z(k) which is deduced from past public play. We set
(ρ(k) , x(k) ) = (ρext,0 , x0 ), v(k) := Eµρext,0 [r(s, a) + x0 (s, k0, y)], and θ(k) := θ0 . In each round,
the p.r.d. chooses with probability ξ∗ := (1 − δ)β whether to start a new phase. In the ﬁrst
round n = τ(k+1) of the following phase k + 1, we ﬁrst deﬁne the auxiliary target w(k+1)
according to
1−δ
1−δ
1
v(k) +
x(k) (ωpub,n−1 ),
ξ∗ w(k+1) + (1 − ξ∗ )z(k) = z(k) −
δ
δ
δ
next apply Lemma 1 with z := w(k) to get λ(k+1) .
If kλ(k+1) − (−ei )k ≥ ε′′0 for all i, we apply Lemma 2 to get (v(k+1) , ρ(k+1) , x(k+1) ) ∈ S,
and ﬁnally update z(k+1) as



1−δ
θ(k) (mn−1 , mn ) − θ(k+1) (ωpub,n−1 , mn ) .
z(k+1) = w(k+1) + (1 − δ)
1+
δξ
Then in each round, the p.r.d. chooses with probability ξ whether to start a new phase. In
round τ(k+2) the auxiliary target will be updated to w(k+2) according to (4) and z(k+2) in the
following transition phase is deﬁned by (5).
If instead kλ(k+1) − (−ei )k < ε′′0 for some i, we apply Lemma 13 with player i, and get
x : S × Y T → RI and γ. We set v(k+1) = γ, and x(k+1) = x. In that case the duration of
phase k + 1 is T . In round τ(k+2) := τ(k+1) + T , we set
z(k+2) =

1
1 − δT
z
−
v(k+1) + (1 − δ)x(k+1) (mτ(k+1) , yτ(k+1) , . . . , yτ(k+1) +T −1 ).
(k+1)
δT
δT

That this recursive construction is well-deﬁned follows as in Lemma 5.
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Under σ, players report truthfully and play ρ(k) in any phase k that is not a punishment
phase. If kλ(k) − (−ei )k < ε′′0 , we let σ(k) be a sequential equilibrium in G(mτ(k) , δ, x(k) ) with
j
payoﬀ v(k) . Under σ, player j plays σ(k)
if his report in round τ(k) is truthful, and otherwise
−j
plays a (sequentially) best reply to σ(k) in the game G(sjτ(k) , m−j
τ(k) , δ, x(k) ).
As in Section A.1.3, one can establish that the continuation payoﬀ under σ is equal to
z(k) at the beginning of a punishment phase, and z(k) + (1 − δ)θ(k) in any round that does
not belong to a punishment phase.
That a player cannot proﬁtably deviate at the action step follows from the deﬁnition of
σ in a punishment phase, and as in Theorem 2 otherwise. That a player cannot proﬁtably
deviate at the reporting step of a non-transition phase is clear during punishment phases
since reports are ignored, and otherwise follows as before.
Consider ﬁnally the reporting step in a round n belonging to a transition phase. In the
speciﬁc case where n is the ﬁrst round following a punishment phase, reports are ignored,
and the action being played is ā0 , hence truthful reporting is trivially optimal. Otherwise,
the belief of player j over S −j has full support, and the optimality of truth-telling follows
along earlier lines, using that (i) (ρext,0 , x0 ) is strictly truthful, and that (ii) the (ex post)
marginal beneﬁt of having misreported, conditional on the p.r.d. choosing to start a new
phase, is at most of the order of (1 − δ) –see the remark at the end of Section F.1.2.
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